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Abstract	 
This thesis critically examines the Russian military intervention in Syria during 
the period of September 2015 – March 2016. It is a study that contributes to the analysis 
of the interrelation of two areas of political studies: media studies and foreign policy. In 
order to describe the logic behind Russian participation in the Syrian conflict, a social 
constructivist reading is suggested; according to which, the way the discourse of the 
Russian intervention has been presented in Russian media indicates the primary role of 
specific understanding of the ethical goals of Russian foreign policy. Specifically, the 
Russian military intervention in Syria is driven, according to the Russian discourse, by 
the need to present itself to the world as a “good actor” through a “just war.”  
Applying the method of qualitative discourse analysis, the thesis deconstructs 
the Russian narrative of intervention in the Syrian civil war through the Russian 
perspective. The results indicate the particular importance of the social function of war 
in Russian foreign policy – the importance of its performative and communicative 
aspect. Moreover, the result is a perceived conflict between two logics of understanding 
of the International –  transcendental and local-centered – is revealed as a potential 
driving force of the modern tensions in the relationship between Russian and the West. 
As a result, a key problem in said relationship is the problem of communication: 
the lack of language both parties would understand. Without such a language, the 
actions of the opponent are continually interpreted, not from the perspective of the 
partner, but from the perspective of the viewer, which in the case of Russian-West 
discourse results in accusations of dishonesty and hypocrisy. 
Finally, the research highlights how the discourse of Syrian intervention is 
constructed and reflects the social function of war in Russia in general. This function of 
a “just war” (and any war in Russia is ‘just’ by default) is to serve as the moral 
cornerstone of the country’s identity, as the mechanism of consolidation and 
purification. It appears that the historical origins of this discursive model of war can be 
traced back to the period of World War II.  
In conclusion, this thesis suggests the need for the further studies of the 
connections between the ways identity is constructed linguistically in the narratives of 
foreign policy and decisions made by politicians. Another question of utmost 
importance is whether there is a substitution to war as a social mechanism of Russian 
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society to experience its moral appropriateness and adherence to moral standards of 
justice.  
 
 
Key words: Russia, Syrian civil war, Russian media, social function of war, 
language in international relations, communication 
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Introduction	
 
Despite the fact that Russia is no longer a superpower, and doubtfully even a 
great power, Russian foreign policy continues to be in the center of debates in both 
academic and policy circles. One of central empirical puzzles about Russian foreign 
policy is the logic of its decision-making. Indeed, Russia has played – and continues to 
play – a high-profile role in most modern security crises, including North Korea’s and 
Iran’s nuclear programs, armed conflicts in the Southern Caucasus, and the continuing 
war in Ukraine which has provoked increased militarization of NATO’s eastern borders 
and alliance security goals in general. During the last two years, two other topics have 
moved into the focus of discussion: alleged Russian interference in the elections in 
Western countries and the role Russia plays in Syria and the Middle East in general. 
What is more, the role of Russia in these conflicts is usually self-contradictory, 
unpredicted, and antagonistic towards the main actors of international security. 
Consequently, it is of no surprise that understanding Russian foreign policy and its 
security and military policy continues to attract the attention if scholars and publicists. 
Consequently, the question of how particular decisions are understood in Russia are 
relevant from both a theoretical perspective, which is addressed in a separate chapter, 
but more importantly on an empirical level. One particular question which still requires 
conceptualization is Russian interference in the Syrian civil war in September 2015. 
The Russian military operation in Syria began on September 30th, 2015 after the 
government of Bashar Assad had made an official request for military help. At this 
point, Russian involvement mostly included air raids and bombings of all anti-Assad 
forces including the Syrian National Coalition, the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant 
(ISIL), al-Nusra Front (al-Qaeda in the Levant), and the Army of Conquest. There was 
limited involvement of ground troops and special operation forces. On March 14, 2016 
the "main body" of Russian forces were officially withdrawn from the country. 
However, low-intensity operations and occasional air strikes continued. No substantial 
changes in the number of territories securely controlled by pro-government forces had 
been achieved. The airstrikes had become the target of criticism of the Human Rights 
Watch, Amnesty International, and Doctors Without Borders, since Russian fighters 
often targeted hospitals alongside military objects and caused thousands of civilian 
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causalities, according to the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights. Allegedly, the 
Russian military used unguided bombs, cluster bombs, incendiaries similar to white 
phosphorus, and thermobaric weapons. According to independent estimates, the cost of 
damaged caused by Russian military involvement is around 38 billion rubles or $546 
million.  
What is more, Russian involvement in the Syrian conflict continues into the 
present day, being one of the riskiest factors in the current international relations 
agenda, since it is in Syria where there is potential for a direct military confrontation 
between Russian and US troops. In February 2018, there was already one such 
confrontation in which hundreds of Russian mercenaries have allegedly been killed – at 
the battle of Khasham. Moreover, it appears that either the Russian elite in fact did not 
care at all about the ISIS threat, or it was genuinely committed to the salvation of the 
Bashar -Assad regime. During the first months of operation, the Russian political 
leadership exhibited signs of very limited understanding of the true configuration of the 
fighting parties in Syria. 
To understand how Russian participation in the Syrian civil war can be 
addressed to contribute to global peace, rather than starting World War III, it is 
important to address the logic behind Russia’s initial decision to interfere. Despite the 
fact that war has been raging for three years there remains a lack of comprehensible 
analysis of the Russian motivation to intervene that would explain the seemingly self-
contradictory Russian behavior. 
Firstly, there is a clear gap between alleged Russian goals in Syria and the 
results of its actions. Initially, Vladimir Putin claimed that the main goal of Russian 
intervention is to fight against the Islamic State. However, it was later revealed that the 
absolute majority of Russian airstrikes targeted armed Syrian opposition instead of ISIS. 
Second, a major paradox concerning Russia’s operations in Syria is its intentions 
concerning possible cooperation with the Western-led anti-ISIS coalition. On the one 
hand, Russia wanted to befriend this coalition, while on the other hand actively 
opposing it.  
The relevance of the question “what was the logic behind Russian intervention 
in the Syrian civil war” still remains urgent and, I would argue, yet unanswered. What is 
more, I would argue that it is impossible to answer this question following the logic of 
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utilitarianism which treats language and rhetoric exclusively as tools to achieve certain 
objective interests. Instead, I am going to address the problem of Russian intervention 
from a constructivist perspective, where the language, identity, and rhetoric are not 
factors of decisions made, but instead the very environment of the decision-making 
process. Following the general approach of post-positivism, the thesis focuses not on 
the material and causal explanations of a particular foreign policy phenomenon, but on 
the processes around how narratives of security are created (Lomagin 2007) or how 
identity influences the understanding of security and shapes security policies 
(Kassianova 2001; Hopf 2005; Williams & Neumann 2000). In the case of Russia, 
particular importance is attached to the narrative of ‘Great Power’ which, according to 
studies, simultaneously limits the range of available policies (Clunan 2009) as enables 
actions that would be incomprehensible for an ordinary country (Volgy et al., 2011, 
Ambrosio, 2005). They do not interfere with foreign policy but are foreign policy; and 
foreign policy, especially when full of self-contradictions, can only be understood 
through deep deconstruction of the narrative that reflects this policy. Thus, my research 
is connected with the general debate in international relations theory, the details of 
which I address in the theory chapter. 
 Aim	of	the	research	
The aim of the thesis is to deconstruct the security narrative and the logic of 
action behind the decision of Russian elite to intervene into the Syrian civil war. 
Following the post-positivist approach, the analysis of media data available will provide 
an insight into Russian understanding of security decision formation. 
 The	object	of	the	research	
This thesis analyses a particular phenomenon of modern Russian foreign policy 
– the Russian decision to intervene into the Syrian civil war from the perspective of the 
security narrative which was built in Russian media to justify this decision. Apart from 
the security narrative, the logic of foreign policy action behind the security narrative is 
the focus of the study. 
The period in the focus of this research is from the 30th of September 2015, with 
the actual beginning of Russian air forces operations in the country, and ends on March 
14th, 2016 when, according to Vladimir Putin, “goals set in front of Russian Ministry of 
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Defense and Russian military are generally met.” However, since any decision is 
premediated, the analysis of Russian discourse begins earlier than September 2015 – in 
May 2015 when the pre-mediation campaign has begun.  	Research	Hypothesis/Argument	
The initial argument of this thesis is that the logic behind the Russian 
intervention, as well as the security narrative of this decision, cannot be understood in a 
separation from the rhetorical function of war phenomenon in Russian identity. This 
function is centered on the idea of war as a way of “being right” and therefore “being 
great.” 
In particular, this thesis argues that within Russian discourse, the performative 
element of warfare as an opportunity to present itself in a way that would reflect 
Russian self-image, as well as to communicate with significant partners on the 
international arena, has been of utmost importance to the Russian leadership. 
 Research	methods	
Apart from secondary literature analysis in the theoretical chapter of the thesis, 
the empirical study of media data will be conducted following the discourse analysis 
approach. In a separate chapter, it is explained why both the method and the data 
selected are relevant to answer the research question of the thesis. To understand the 
discourse of war in modern Russia, an analysis of a total of 36 Sunday news reports via 
the program Vesti Nedeli is conducted. 
 Limitations	of	the	research	
As with any interpretivist study there is a danger that the performed analysis gap 
is only a part of the complex discourse, with existing opportunities for yet deeper 
deconstruction. Moreover, the very theoretical background of the research avoids 
providing strong causal answers for the problem in question. 
 Structure	of	the	paper	
The submitted thesis consists of the following structure. The first is this 
beginning introductory chapter and outline. The second chapter provides a theoretical 
overview of the foundation of the proposed thesis: the role of narratives and language in 
security policy formation. Additionally, the second chapter explains the methodology of 
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the research, relevance of selected data, as well as justification for why it is 
representation of the worldview behind Russian foreign policy. The third chapter is the 
actual discourse analysis of the selected data with no interpretations to this data given. 
The objective of the paper is to discern the structural elements of the Russian narrative 
as it was constructed. In the fourth and final chapter, the revealed narratives are 
analyzed against the background of other actions made by the Russian government and 
contextualized in the view of existing theories. In the conclusion, the argument 
developed in this introduction is further developed and potential practical 
implementations of the research are presented. 
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Synopsis		
Having identified the aim, relevance, object of the research, hypothesis, and 
methodology, this thesis will proceed according to the structure described above: from 
theoretical debate to the empirical analysis of media data. 
During the literature review, theoretical justification for the approach used in the 
research will be given. In the following two chapters, empirical analysis of selected data 
will be conducted and then contextualized against the background of other approaches 
to examine the logics behind Russian foreign policy actions. 
 This thesis explores the complex relationship between the rhetorical function of 
war in the Russian political imaginary and the Russian intervention in the Syrian civil 
war. Then concluding with a summary of the findings and the practical importance of 
the thesis. Lists of references and media data used are provided at the end of the 
research.   
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Chapter	I.	Theory	and	Method	
 
Theoretical	approach	of	the	research	
 
In order to answer the research question of the thesis, the approach of social 
constructivism has been chosen. Its adherents put particular emphasis on the role of 
identities: “at the center of political activity is the construction of a link between policy 
and identity that makes the two appear consistent with each other” (Hansen, 2006, 
p.28).  In the framework of this thesis, there is little space to for an in-depth look at the 
details of all aspects of the existing debate between the proponents of the different 
logics of social action. Instead, the research is focused on the one particular element of 
social action: the role language, identity, and discourse play in the international 
relations from the perspective of foreign policy shaping. 
However, before moving any further with the thesis it is important to answer, as 
the researcher, if all the discourse and narratives spread by Russian officials and media 
will be treated the same way – exclusively as a set of rhetorical actions, or if it will 
assume that, apart from being a part of propaganda projects, these statements reflect 
deep normative and strategic beliefs of the Russian elite about Russia and its role in 
international relations. There is no right or wrong answer to this question, however, 
though there are strong reasons to deny the Russian statements any real meaning. After 
all, modern Russia is a trend-setter in terms of post-truth politics, including media and 
war. 
Here it is important to point out that focus on language does not necessarily 
imply the choice of social constructivism as the theoretical foundation of the research. 
For example, one way of looking into the problem of the discourse and language’s 
function in international relations is an instrumentalist perspective which, more or less, 
fits into the logic of consequentialism’s approach. This tradition is represented in 
particular by the school of “rhetorical action,” for which discourse and values is an 
intervening variable in an actor’s behavior. It can be used to empower an otherwise 
weak side or to limit the range of possible politics. A good example of rhetorical power 
that can be found in the mechanisms of the security community is the expansion of the 
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EU in 2004, as it is presented in Schimmelfenning’s piece “The Community trap: 
Liberal norms, Rhetorical Action” (Schimmelfenning, 2001). In his interpretation, those 
Eastern European countries that became EU members in 2004 managed to successfully 
exercise a “rhetorical action” strategy – the strategic use of a norms-based argument by 
weakly socialized actors in a community whose constitutive values and norms they 
share. 
Here the research highlights that, on a theoretical level, studies of the school of 
“rhetorical action” are conducted in the same utilitarian tradition as those of the realist 
school. In other words, they treat identity politics, discourse, rhetoric, and norms as 
tools through which weak or strong political actors can achieve a pragmatic goal. Thus, 
we are dealing with essentially the same ontology as in political realism when symbolic 
politics have no value on their own and with the actors being completely free to refer to 
them, depending on political interests. This approach has certain merits as it allows one 
to look beyond mere language games, if one assumes that the real matter of 
international politics is exclusively one of power and force with everything else being 
only a recourse for power maximization. 
In contrast to rhetorical action, social constructivism offers an epistemological 
approach for the analysis of foreign policy, being focused not on the event itself but on 
the interpretations of said event. For example, while investigating the meaning of 9/11 
for American security policies, Krebs and Lobasz argue that: “We proceed rather from 
the presumption that September 11, like all political events, did not speak for itself. It 
required interpretation, and it did not have to lead to a War on Terror … how it was 
publicly represented and by whom, how, and whether those representations were 
contested … The world we lived in after September 11 was by no means inevitable, and 
alternative worlds could have emerged … while the attacks were very real, the 
insecurity they generated was necessarily a cultural production” (Lobasz&Krebs, 2007, 
p. 413). Consequently, instead of power, ideas, or interests, in the center of Krebs and 
Lobasz’ analysis lies language itself. This approach is more structured in the later book 
of Krebs – “Narrating foreign policy.” He argues that the largest questions of national 
security require leaders to engage public audiences and thus to legitimate, or provide 
public justification for, the policies they prefer. Moreover, not all possible policies can 
be legitimated in the public sphere, with conceivable but non-legitimate policies being 
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impossible to pursue. As a result, much of national security politics is centered on the 
competition over the meaning of events. Once such a competition is temporally 
resolved, a dominant narrative emerges which shapes the national security policies that 
states pursue (Krebs, 2015, pp.2-3). 
It is interesting that Krebs’s approach often pays respect to the utilitarian usage 
of strategic narratives or what can be called a rhetorical action. However, for this 
approach language also appears to have more value on its own. In particular, the non-
utilitarian role of narratives is important for Krebs when a new situation emerges – 
something previously unimaginable and inconceivable, for which no rules exist. In his 
other piece “Twisting Tongues and Twisting Arms: The Power of Political Rhetoric,” 
Krebs, in co-authorship with Patrick Jackson, defines his approach to foreign policy as 
coercive constructivism, arguing that: “the social identity has an effect on social and 
political outcomes, regardless of whether or not the actor internalizes the components 
constituting this identity” (Jackson, Krebs, 2007, p.57). This coercive constructivism 
placed the importance of language games beyond utilitarian rhetorical action as “elites, 
even brilliant and authoritative orators, do not stand outside or transcend social 
structures that they then manipulate at will” (Krebs, 2015, p.4).  Moreover, “it is 
through narrative that human beings order disordered experience and impart meaning to 
themselves and their world. Insofar as any grand strategy rests on a coherent portrait of 
the global environment, it rests on narrative” (Krebs, 2015, p.2). 
The coercive constructivist approach assumes that the analysis of the claims 
Russian foreign policy makes is important no matter if the country is capable of 
supporting them. From this perspective, claims help discern the strategic narrative that 
the country’s foreign policy decision makers believe in since, “alleged facts acquire 
meaning only when people weave them into coherent stories” (Krebs, 2015, p. 4). 
Consequently, the stories told by the Russian elite reflect the world as it is seen by 
Russian foreign policy. However, “the existence of a public sphere ensures that actors 
have to regularly and routinely explain and justify their behavior” (Risse, 2000, p. 21), 
and there is no conditional link between justification and truth. In other words, if one 
wants to see inside Russian foreign policy, then one has to look into it from within; 
giving Russian messages the benefit of a doubt in a way that, no matter how Russian 
military, diplomatic, and economic capabilities are developed, the language used by the 
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Russian mainstream reflects the world as seen by the Russian decision-makers. 
Consequently, it is possible to assume that the foreign policy decisions made by the 
country during recent years are the result of the way the Russian elite sees itself and the 
country.  
In the submitted thesis the approach of social constructivism is applied and, 
despite its limitations, addresses the same challenges and problems that make the claims 
of the “rhetorical action” model so appealing. First, however, it is necessary to explain 
what the key elements of this approach are and how, hypothetically, they can be applied 
to study the problem of the logic behind Russian foreign policy in general, and the 
decision to intervene in Syria in particular.  
To begin with, instead of power or interests, social constructivism views 
language as the essence of politics. This ontological claim reflects the choice any 
researcher has to make while discussing either domestic or international politics. There 
are several arguments that strengthen such a huge role attached to language. Indeed, 
“only humans give voice to the moral sense; only they articulate, reason about and 
debate good and evil, noble and ignoble, beneficial and harmful” (Krebs, 2015, p.8). 
Without such articulations no interests can be recognized and no power plays can be 
performed. Moreover, human actions, including political aims, are inherently limited by 
what one perceives as undoubtedly true, right, and just. Additionally, these perceptions 
are not random but structured in discourses and narratives. Discourse, as Michel 
Foucault famously argues, “is the thing for which and by which there is struggle, 
discourse is the power to be seized’ (Foucault, 1981, p. 52-53). While scholars of 
rational choice would argue that, “states have little choice but to adapt themselves to the 
dictates of an unforgiving international system, that narratives are the product of events 
whose meaning is clear to all, or that a narrative’s dominance simply reflects the 
interests of powerful groups and leaders” (Krebs, 2015, p.2), social constructivists will 
look into how narratives and discourses exist and evolve through revealing their 
assumptions, contradictions, and metaphors (Steele 2010; Jarvis and Holland, 2014). 
What is more, under the social constructivist approach the processes through which one 
can analyze these deep-rooted beliefs are inherently public and linguistic, and that is 
why the analysis of public communication including media is relevant. 
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Russian security policy is not an exception from a social constructivist analysis. 
There are two main arguments to why it is fruitful for this thesis. Firstly, the paper will 
defend the idea that security policy, as well as national interest, depends on political 
purpose (Clunan, 2009, p. 31). Though, as a social constructivist would argue, the 
political can be understood only through linguistic means within a particular narrative 
that gives sense to these means. It also makes sense to follow Threvor Thrall’s 
argument, according to which a researcher should be less skeptical of the idea of 
“identity-based politics” in comparison with instrumentalism. In particular, Thrall 
argues that “threat framing provides a more useful explanatory tool than elite 
manipulation of information in understanding threat perceptions” (Thrall, 2007, p.484). 
Secondly, social constructivism addresses the problem of looking into Russian 
logic from the perspective of this logic and not from an outsider’s assumptions of it. 
Indeed, no matter how Russian discourse is seen from the outside, it still reflects 
assumptions, contradictions, and metaphors regarding how Russian decision makers 
think about foreign policy. And since this discourse is important for those who set up 
the agenda for Russian foreign policy, it is also important for those who study it. In fact, 
narrative is not necessarily underpinned by the utilitarian interests of political actors, but 
rather by the intrinsic value of the established frames that enable the non-contradictory 
worldview. After all, as Krebs and Jackson argue, “arguments can prove powerful only 
when the commonplaces on which they draw are already present in the rhetorical field” 
(Jakson&Krebs, 2007, p.46). Politicians are rarely completely free or instrumental while 
creating security narratives or making sense out of a new security event. Neither can 
they be purely utilitarian. They have to follow and modify frames that were already 
present in the public discourse, with the public being influenced by rhetoric created 
decades prior to the matter in question. 
As an interim conclusion, it is possible to argue that identity and symbolic power 
influence the development of security-related decisions. All schools of international 
relations agree with this statement one way or another. The main debate is whether such 
an effect is a result of utilitarian calculations. or whether identity and beliefs affect 
foreign policy on a deeper level by pre-mediating the security-related decisions through 
maintaining the worldview decision-makers consider worth defending or promoting. 
Ultimately, an answer to this question is the choice of a researcher. 
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In this thesis, I agree with those scholars who look into the questions of identity 
and rhetoric in a less instrumental way. Instead, one can view language games and 
security frames as phenomena that form the preferences of an actor before the need to 
act has even emerge. It appears that, prior to making a security decision, one must 
determine “who am I” and “how does the world look?” This is precisely the moment 
when identity and values become extremely important since they essentially provide the 
ability to act to make any decision in principle. Following this approach, while 
conducting a security analysis, the scholar himself must deliberate what the worldview 
of an actor was, in what frames was it described, how these frames have emerged etc. 
Moreover, it would be necessary to lower skepticism and any initial inclination to treat 
rhetoric as a manipulative tool, and to treat it as indication of certain beliefs or outcome 
of historical practices instead. This is especially difficult after 2014, in the so-called 
post-truth epoch when the borderline between trolling, fake, and genuine belief became 
nearly unintelligible. Although, for those who are interested in identity, values, 
language, and narratives in their relations to security subjects, it appears that there is no 
better choice. 
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Methodology	of	the	research	
 
Qualitative discourse analysis is the foundational methodology of this research. 
Discourse analysis assumes that "...political thought and behaviour... cannot be 
understood without references to the distinctive vocabularies used by agents in given 
context... " (Richter, 1995, 124). In other words, the primary analysis of this method is 
that the way people communicate is the key to understand the decisions they make. 
Generally speaking, discourse can be understood in two ways. It can be seen as the 
coherent whole of certain rules that operate on a macro level and structure the way 
people think. Consequently, there can be several discursive fields that deal with 
different problems. The second understanding is narrower – discourse is meant to be a 
coherent set of statements. At the same time, as it was mentioned in the previous 
chapter, in the framework of this research discourse is understood, not as aspects of 
language, but as a system of meanings assigned to objects through linguistic means. 
This system reflects shared beliefs and common values (Fisher, Gottweis, 2012). Within 
this system, multiple narratives can exist, with narrative being conceptualized as 
structures linking the various elements of the discourse into a coherent, portrayable, and 
communicable form. 
Since the character of the data which is used for this research is both visual and 
textual, instead of computational discourse analysis such as spatial models 
(Medzihorsky, Popovich, Jenne, 2017), the approach chosen in this thesis is manual 
deconstruction of the text with particular importance being attached to unclear 
references and indirect notions that the discourse is often constructed of. The goal is not 
to calculate Russian foreign policy utility functions but instead to figure out what 
worldview it operates in, and whether this worldview is understood as a hegemonic or 
dominant narrative. A hegemonic narrative is not a new idea for international relations 
theory. As Stuart Hall points out, hegemonic projects aspire to the remaking of common 
sense (Hall, Du Gay, 1996). Moreover, security can also be understood in this 
framework: “a dominant narrative of national security is a realized hegemonic project. It 
is a social fact, not an object of active political challenge. During such routine times, 
there is political contest, sometimes even intense, but it is usually takes place within the 
terms of the dominant narrative” (Krebs, 2015, 5). For this research, the narrative of 
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Russian foreign policy is understood as a hegemonic narrative in which importance 
goes beyond rhetoric, being the means of structuring the social order. 
 
Justification of the type of data selection 
 
To answer the research question, apart from the official statements of the 
Russian officials, the main data type consists of weekly 1-hour long Sunday news 
programs from the most popular Russian TV show “Vesti Nedeli.” There are several 
reasons why pro-governmental Sunday news reports provide this research with 
representative material on Russian elite’s understanding of foreign policy. 
To begin with, the unique character of Russian pro-governmental media allows 
consideration of them as the voice of power that represents its worldview. The Russian 
government also has an absolute control over federal television which remains very 
influential in today’s Russia. The majority of the Russian population still treat federal 
TV news broadcasts to be the primary source of information. As polls conducted in 
December 2015 indicate (Levada–Tsentr, 2015): only 21% of Russian citizens acquire 
its information about the world from the Internet, only 13% from social networks, and 
85% from TV.  Moreover, around two-thirds of the population have no access to a 
source of information that is independent from the government (Levada–Tsentr, 2015). 
Maria Lipman (2009) describes the situation in Russian federal television as ‘national 
channels are mostly aimed at those Russians who constitute the reliable electoral base of 
Putin’s regime: the more provincial, the elderly, the less educated’. 
Vladimir Putin managed to create a complex system of control over media both 
traditional and digital (Belin, 2002, 21). In other words, “the Russian media ecology 
today is characterized by an abundance of information, but also by a set of mechanisms 
which limit the accessibility of that information. In these circumstances, the Russian 
elite – as with Putin, above – is able to use the saturation of media as a means to 
obfuscate the extent to which it has realigned the media ecology to its own ends” 
(Hoskings, Shchelin, 2018). On praxis, it means that the modern Russian authoritarian 
government has, to a certain extent, limitless opportunities to frame media coverage of 
an any event, compared to authorities in a democracy. In particular, Russian mainstream 
media does not face elasticity constraints explored by (Baum&Groeling, 2010) who 
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argue: “Early in a conflict, elites, especially the president, have an informational 
advantage that renders public perceptions of ‘reality’ very elastic. As events unfold and 
as the public gathers more information, this elasticity recedes, allowing alternative 
frames to challenge the administration’s preferred frame” (Baum & Groeling, 2010, 
443). 
 In contrast to democratic regimes, the Russian media is an example of an 
“arrested one.” From a media studies perspective, this means the following: the 2000s 
were a time of optimism and belief in the possibilities of new media to not only combat 
the production of fakes, but also overcome the problem of agenda-setting and 
gatekeeping by large national news organizations. It appeared that modern technologies 
had opened a window of opportunities for journalists to provide their viewers with 
dozens of competing narratives in a digitized environment. These opportunities 
included, for instance, networked communication (Barzilai-Nahon, 2008), citizen 
journalism (Allan & Thorsen, 2009) and citizen witnessing (Allan, 2013). In the world 
of transparent media, fake production should have become impossible. However, in the 
2010s, old concerns about the role of mass media in conflict depiction returned. 
According to the framework designed by Andrew Hoskings & Ben O'Loughlin 
(Hoskings, O'Loughlin 2015), war and media relations have entered the third phase— 
“the arrested warfare.” This phase has brought the return of questions that were 
considered to have been settled during the previous years. 
The process of adaptation of news institutions and governmental organizations 
has taken place. The very multitude of information available has paved the way towards 
a principle change in the nature of media production. There is no problem for a viewer 
to get information; on the contrary, one is overloaded with hundreds of thousands of 
facts including thousands of fakes. As a result, the goal of modern media has shifted 
from information production to information verification. Rather than collecting 
information, which can be exercised by networks of independent bloggers and 
journalists, mainstream media enjoys the power of agenda setting. Dominant media 
possesses a kind of authority to produce a particular report or image making it “fair” 
and recognizable for the massive audience. Against the background of millions of 
information pieces, “any content that is acclaimed as alternative, oppositional, or 
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outside only acquires significant value when acknowledged and remediated by the 
mainstream” (Hoskings, O'Loughlin , 2015, 1323).  
All the descriptions of the character of the Russian media environment is 
necessary to indicate the often-undervalued element of Russian propaganda. Having no 
uncontrolled competitors for the hegemonic narrative in media, the authority can afford 
to ignore the contestation element of any news message. As the result, the Russian 
government enjoys a unique kind of recourse – the power to create a TV reality, which 
will dominate the popular discourse. What is more, this kind of reality does not have to 
comply with actual events in the country or around the globe. In other words, because 
domestic media ecology is so comfortable for the Russian elite, it can be used as the 
means of retranslating foreign policy principles and worldviews to fit their beliefs. 
Counter-intuitively, precisely because mainstream media is not independent in Russia 
and has no agency of its own, as well as having its audience consist of a population who 
takes its messages at face value, pro-governmental media discourse can be treated as the 
reflection of the deep-rooted beliefs and principles of Russian foreign-policy decision-
makers.   
At the same time, there is a lack of studies that genuinely attempt to deconstruct 
the message of Russian pro-governmental media. Most are focused on treating media 
exclusively as an instrument of state policy (Pomerantsev and Weiss, 2014; Van Herpen 
2016) based on the frameworks of "agenda setting" (McCombs and Shaw, 1972) and 
"gatekeeping" (White, 1997). For this research, such an approach of the data treatment 
is too narrow. Instead, this thesis applies an alternative to the instrumental approach that 
treats media as the “spaces of appearances” (Silverstone, 2007; Arendt, 1998), places 
where political practices are played out (Livingstone, 2009). From this standpoint 
Russian pro-governmental media can be treated as a reliable source of data on Russian 
foreign policy hegemonic discourse, and that can provide an insight into the logic 
behind Russian foreign policy formation processes.  
 
Data Timeline Justification 
 
The main body of data consists of every, roughly 1-hour long, “Vesti Nedeli” 
issued from May 2015 to March 2016 – the period from the beginning of the 
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legitimation campaign for the intervention in Syria in Russian media until the first 
official “withdrawal” of Russian troops from Syria. This timeline is established 
empirically. Using the media analytic platform of Medialogia (http://www.mlg.ru/), it 
became possible to collect the data on the intensity of the presence of certain themes on 
Russian federal TV channels, including the war in Syria. The Medialogia database is 
usually used by PR-specialists and, unfortunately, does not provide free access to its 
files for the average user. However, upon my request, I was provided with short-term 
access (3 days) to the database and managed to collect all necessary data, which can be 
presented in raw format upon request. The results of the data collection are presented in 
Table 1 and indicate that, in as early as the first month, one can observe the trend of the 
increased presence of the “Syria” problem in the media— precisely in May 2015. 
Following this timeline, the research performs qualitative discourse analysis of all 
Sunday news programmes of Vesti Nedeli with Dmitrii Kiseleov. Fortunately, all data 
on this news program is available online on the official you-tube channel of Vesti 
media: 
(https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vMLaYWKvM0Q&list=PL6MnxjOjSRsRzsISAl
U-JcbTi7_a5wB_v). In total 36 news programs were analyzed. 
In sum, the proposed methodology is adequate for the research question of the 
paper. The thesis has a reliable data source, with the data itself being representative of 
the problem analyzed. The selected research method allows the deconstruction of the 
existing hegemonic narrative and addresses the implicit problem of the logic of foreign 
policy actions hidden behind the words of Russian propaganda makers. In the following 
chapter of the thesis, the findings of this qualitative analysis – the detailed 
deconstruction of the legitimation of the Russian intervention into the Syrian civil war 
as it can be seen in Russian mainstream media – are presented. 
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Chapter	II.	Russian	Narrative	of	its	intervention	in	Syrian	civil	
war	
 
 
To begin the analysis of Russian military operations one has to start with the 
analysis of the exact goals and tasks set by the Russian military leadership in front of 
the Russian troops and its allies. It is not an easy assignment as, even during the first 
period of intervention, official goals have been changed several times. Initially Vladimir 
Putin claimed that the main goal of Russian intervention is to fight against the Islamic 
State. What is more, officially the upper house of the Russian Parliament issued a 
mandate to Putin on September 30th to provide “exclusively air support for Syrian 
government forces in their operation against ISIS.”  During his speech at the UN 
headquarters on the second day of the Russian intervention (September 28, 2015) Putin 
argued for the creation of an international coalition of "all forces that resist the Islamic 
State and other terrorist organizations." Two weeks later, the fight against ISIS suddenly 
turned into the stabilization of the legitimate regime of Bashar Assad.  
In February 2016, Sergey Lavrov returned to the counter-terrorism narrative as 
justification of Russian air strikes: "Russian airstrikes won't be terminated until we 
actually annihilate terrorist organizations: ISIL, Jabhat an-Nusra and the like. I see no 
reasons to terminate these strikes." This, among other goals, claimed to be the rationale 
behind Russian intervention as mentioned by the Russian commander-in-chief: "to clear 
Syria from the terrorist fighters and protect Russia from possible terrorist attacks" and 
"stabilising the legitimate power in Syria and creating the conditions for political 
compromise" (Levada, 2015). 
As the result, the narrative of Russian intervention into the Syrian civil war has 
never been exactly structured within the statements of Russian officials. In contrast, 
from the very beginning the intervention consisted of multiple ideas, which were 
complexly intertwined during TV shows. Consequently, to investigate the narrative of 
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the Russian intervention from the Russian perspective, one has to deconstruct it first to 
its elements and then reveal how they were connected. 
Therefore, the structure of this part of the thesis is as follows. The first chapter is 
mostly descriptive and divided into three parts: Part One will present what can be called 
the “rationalist narrative” of intervention; Part Two will reveal the “ethical narrative,” 
and Part Three will be concerning the “diplomatic narrative” of the conflict. In the 
second chapter the collected data and revealed narratives will be analyzed in the context 
of existing literature on Russian identity and its connection with foreign policy. 
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Part	I.	“Rationalist	narratives”	
 
1.1	“Preventive	measures”	
 
The intervention in Syria has been justified in the Russian state narrative in 
multiple ways. This thesis begins with an analysis of the narrative that can be 
considered the “most official,” since it was used by the Russian president during the 
first days of intervention. In particular, the purpose of Russian intervention in the Syrian 
civil war has been proclaimed necessary to protect Russia against the terrorist threat of 
ISIS. To be more precise, Russian media claimed that, “should the government of 
Bashar Assad fall, terrorists will get resources to move toward our borders: in Central 
Asia, the Caucasus and Russia. Therefore, it is better to stop the barbarians there” (VN, 
27/09/2015, 3:39)1. However, in contrast to other narratives, the idea of “preventive 
measures” serves as a background for more important Russian propaganda theses. There 
are several reasons to claim this. 
To begin with, the first references to this narrative appear not long before the 
intervention began – on September the 13th, when the show runner announced that the 
direct threat for Damascus posed during the offense of terrorist forces creates a new 
challenge to Russia (VN, 13/09/2015, 8:51).  
Secondly the “preventive measures” narrative has been highlighted only during 
four issues of the TV program: on September 20th “barbaric Caliphate is crawling 
towards Russia” (VN, 20/09/2015, 16:29), on September 27th and repeated October 4th 
“active defense against closing enemy” (VN, 4/10/2015, 3:23), later on December 27th 
“we must not let the hordes of terrorists from there come to us” (VN, 27/12/2015, 6:57), 
and finally referring to it on the 20th of March 2016 “had we not interfered the 
barbarians would have already been here” (VN, 20/03/2015, 3:39). In contrast to the 
screen time devoted to the promotion and discussion of other elements of war in Syria, 
the idea of “preventive measures” was referred to only during the launch of the 																																																								1	The	way	references	to	video-data	are	presented	is	following:	VN	stands	for	“Vesti	Nedel”	-	the	name	of	the	program,	than	comes	the	day	the	program	was	aired	and	finally	the	exact	timing	of	the	citation	on	the	respected	video.	Since	all	programs	are	taken	from	the	official	channels	in	the	list	of	references	only	references	to	the	databases	are	given.	
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operation in its first “completion” and before the New Year when the general narrative 
of Russian intervention in Syria was re-affirmed. 
In sum, a detailed analysis of the TV news report puts “preventive measures” 
justification of the intervention in a delicate position. On the one hand it is an integral 
part of the general narrative of the Russian operation in Syria. It marks its beginning 
and its end. On the other hand its importance in contrast to other narratives is relatively 
small, as if the Russian media itself does not fully believe in the potential of this idea to 
justify the operation in the eyes of the domestic audience. 
 
1.2	“Military	exercise”	
  
The second rationalist narrative of the intervention in Syria is the demonstration 
of Russian military might and military exercise of Russian pilots in a real war 
environment. For example, on October the 11th, Russian television has been praising 
“first combat experience of the newest Russian ballistic missile” (VN, 10/10/2015, 
5:28). Moreover, for the following ten minutes, Dmitrii Kisiliov had been comparing 
the Russian missile “Kalibr” to the American “Tomahawk.” Later the narrative of 
“military might demonstration” was repeated on December 27th.  
A key difference in this narrative is that it has never been announced, but rather 
presented in a purely visual way for direct TV-reports from the battlegrounds. In fact, 
often the “Syria-part” of Sunday news broadcasts had been constructed from two parts –  
which in this thesis I define as “preaching” and “war porn.” “Preaching” involves the 
show-runner explaining the logic, goal, and meaning of the event to the audience. 
Whereas “war porn” intends to entertain the viewers using computer-game type videos. 
The former is essentially textual, and it is the “preaching” which will be the focus of the 
analysis of this thesis. The latter is mostly visual. This thesis won’t analyze this element 
of Russian media coverage of the Syrian civil war in detail however, it is important to 
point out that 5-10 minutes of TV reports from Syrian battlefronts have become 
essential parts of all Sunday news reports from the begging of the time intervention to 
the end of the period of observation. This also explains why preference during the 
military operation was given towards air strikes of different kinds (the newest Su-34 
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strike fighters, KA-52 attacks helicopters, Buk-M2 missile systems) – they look 
attractive in federal television reports and helped build an image of power.  
What is more, the results of air strikes can be interpreted rather freely in media. 
In particular, during the first two months of Russian intervention (October –November), 
Russian military officials reported thousands of destroyed objects of ISIS infrastructure 
including dozens of headquarters. From a media perspective such a claim does not 
require validation – it is enough to show images and videos of landing planes and 
explosions on the ground. Based on these reports already in October, Russians were 
informed by the federal TV that decisive victory in Syria had already been achieved. 
 
Pragmatic narrative summary 
Despite being repeated in times of critical junctures, pragmatic justifications for 
Russian intervention in Syria seem to be the least important for the Russian narrative of 
intervention into the Syrian civil war. It appears that the discussed arguments of the 
prevention of the terrorist threat to Russia and the “military exercise” idea are used in 
order to avoid the need to define the exact goal of Russian intervention. 
Consequently, since the pragmatic narrative is so non-central, other justifications 
for intervention must be analyzed. In particular those that are connected with the 
problem of the Russian self and Russian understanding of what enemy threatens this 
self. In the following part, the thesis discusses “ethical” and “moral” segments of the 
general narrative of the war in Syria that were present on Russian television during the 
period of observation. 
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Part	II.	Ethical	narratives.	
Though it has never been part of the narrative as announced by top Russian 
officials of the intervention into the Syrian civil war, ethical considerations have proven 
to be the central part of the war narrative on Russian television. What is more, in 
contrast to rationalist elements of the war narrative, “ethical discourse” is constantly re-
affirmed and follows the structure proposed by Ernesto Laclau (Laclau, 2014) and 
Shantal Mouffe (Mouffe, 2000), who developed the concept of the “constitutive other.” 
This 'other' creates meaningful context for the nation self’s development which, in its 
turn, is possible only through such an interaction with other members of international 
society. In the context of war it also means that, before a nation resorts to violence in 
order to protect certain values or defend certain interests, it has to build an image of 
what these interests are. And such an understanding emerges only as a result of 
interaction with others or reflections on the previous experiences of such an interaction. 
 Consequently, in the following parts of the chapter, the thesis will discuss 
ethical oppositions proposed by the Russian media and what they can mean as a 
representation of the Russian-self in the context of the war in Syria. 
 
2.1	“Evil	against	good”	or	“Those	who	cause	destruction”	and	“Those	who	protect	
and	restore”	
 
From the very beginning of its coverage of potential Russian intervention into 
Syria, the Russian media has been promoting the story according to which the fight in 
Syria is nothing less than a clash between good and evil. 
The first and most obvious evil is ISIS. ISIS is always presented in Russian 
media as a violent force which seeks to destroy civilization itself: “they perform the 
unthinkable: kill innocent children for not fasting” (VN, 28/06/2015, 1:09:22). “In 
Summer 2015, barbarians of the psedo-islamic Caliphate have been spreading across 
Syria and Iraq, they slaughtered Christians, slaughtered army officers, sunk cages full of 
people, destroyed the monuments of cultural heritage” (VN, 21/02/2016, 3:02). 
Moreover, religious motives are directly integrated into the narrative on several 
occasions, for example: “they [ISIS] seek to kill all Christians” (VN, 27/09/2015, 
1:28:10). Therefore, the “barbaric Caliphate is the challenge for Russia and the world” 
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(VN, 27/12/2015, 4:31). Consequently, Russian actions in Syria are nothing less than a 
“fight to save people’s lives, to save the future of civilization” (VN, 06/12/2015, 6:59), 
the “fight of good against evil in Syria … good prevails” (VN, 13/03/2016, 0:47). Thus, 
the first layer of the ethical dimension of Russian actions in Syria is a global fight 
between forces of order and forces of chaos. And this fight, according to the Russian 
president, is “just and right” (VN, 20/03/2016, 19.04) with Vladimir Putin acting in 
Syria “with the generosity of a Russian and efficiency of a German” (VN, 01/11/2015, 
20:32). 
 It is important to note that nothing is said about the political or economic 
motives of either side of the conflict. Instead, the Russian media presents the picture of 
an apocalyptic struggle in which Russia fights on the side of the “good guys.” What is 
more, this narrative of fighting on the side of justice is constantly reaffirmed during the 
whole period of observation. It appears that moral elements in Russian logic behind the 
decision to intervene into the Syrian civil war are far more important to Russian media 
than any utilitarian motive; and the result of Russian actions in Syria as it was 
summarized in March 2016 is that they “stopped a global, terrifying evil” (VN, 
13/03/2016, 19:28).  
However, ISIS is not the only destructive force the Russian narrative was 
focused on. If anything, ISIS is only at the forefront of a bigger fight between the forces 
that promote the destruction of state institutions and Russia who keeps peace and 
balance. Behind the self-evident evil of ISIS there is a hidden puppet master – the USA, 
in particular, and the West in general.  
The first reference to the USA in the context of a global fight between good and 
evil can be found in a broadcast from June 28, 2015. While discussing the consequences 
of terrorist attacks in Tunisia, the Russian media claimed the United States was 
responsible for the chaos ruining the region: “The Arab spring, orchestrated by the USA 
without any feeling of responsibility, has destroyed the traditional way of life in the 
region and moved millions of people out of balance” (VN, 28/06/2015, 16:45). 
Consequently, according to the same report, ISIS “has been brought up by the USA … 
after they destroyed the state in Iraq” (VN, 28/06/2015, 1:07:41, 1:07:50), with the 
USA losing control over it (VN, 28/06/2015, 17:50) and “ISIS has been created by the 
USA to fight against Assad in Syria” (VN, 12/07/2015, 1:36:55). 
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In contrast to the “rationalist” narrative, references to the narrative of 
“destructive force” have been repeated one way or another during the period of 
observation: “Damascus has been fighting against terrorists supported by the might of 
the USA and the West” (VN, 13/09/2015, 11:04), “In Syria the USA has been fighting 
on the same side with the terrorist Caliphate and trying to destroy Syria” (VN, 
20/09/2015, 10:19), “due to the US interventions, state institutions and way of life has 
been destroyed globally … instead of the triumph of democracy and progress, the USA 
brought violence, poverty and social catastrophe” (VN, 4/10/2015, 28:00), “the USA 
interfered [in countries] – left chaos behind them – left – who should clean it?” (VN, 
4/10/2015, 34:48), “the USA acts with no sense of responsibility destroying countries” 
(VN, 13/12/2015, 13:16) etc.  
   Following the logic of linguistic opposition, Russian actions and motivation 
has been described using the following metaphor of restoration and peace: “Russia will 
keep supporting the government of Bashar Assad as the healthy force in its fight 
against terrorism” (VN, 13/09/2015, 09:59); “Russia saves Obama from the 
consequences of the failure of his policy in Syria” (VV, 27/09/2015, 14:19); “[The 
Russian goal is] to strengthen governmental institutions wherever they survived” (VV, 
4/10/2015, 32:24); “Russia protects its allies” (VN, 11/10/2015, 11:11); “The Russian 
goal is to support the legitimate government” (VN, 18/10/2015, 12:28); and “Putin is 
an obstacle for those who want to destroy countries” (VN, 31/01/2015, 14:55). 
Anti-Americanism has long been the cornerstone of Russian foreign policy 
discourse. What is important for further analysis is the fact that the USA is not criticized 
through interests-based arguments, but as ethically flawed. This pattern is developed 
even stronger in the next opposition that seems to be central for Russian propaganda: 
“truth” against “fakes” 
 
2.2	“Honesty	and	Truth”	against	“Lies	and	Fakes”	
As the thesis discussed previously, Russian actions in Syria have been presented 
as the fight between good and evil. However, the civil war in Syria was not just between 
the government of Bashar Assad and ISIS. By the moment of Russian intervention, the 
US-led coalition had been performing air strikes against ISIS for 5 months. What is 
more, since ISIS and the USA were nothing else but different sides of evil, the Russian 
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narrative had to provide its audience with an explanation of why one evil force is 
fighting against the other. In the following part, this thesis discusses another central 
opposition in the Syrian civil war discourse on Russian television, which seems to 
provide an answer to this paradox – “truth against lies”. 
Adjectives used most frequently on Russian television, while talking about 
Russian actions in Syria and events surrounding them, are “honest” and “real” – “Russia 
is ready to participate in a real anti-terrorist coalition with an honest purpose and real 
coordination of the actions of all healthy forces involved” (VN, 13/09/2015, 10:10), 
“Russia is open to ally with all powers who honestly fight against terrorism” (VN, 
11/10/2015, 30:21), “we must honestly unite our efforts, we must honestly stop tearing 
the planet apart” (VN, 24/01/2016, 4:02), “Russia has no hidden intentions, it is honest” 
(VN, 14/02/2016, 15:51), “due to powerful and honest airstrikes terrorists are 
retreating” (VN, 21/02/2016, 5:30), “truly grateful Syrians who kept telling me: 
‘Russians are honest’” (VN, 13/03/2016, 0:47). 
Accordingly, while discussing the character of two anti-terrorist coalitions, the 
Russian narrative usually followed the binary opposition “real” and “fake.” 
Discounting, in fact, the sincerity of the international fight against ISIS which had 
begun before the decision of the Russian government to intervene in the Syrian civil 
war was announced. Already as of the 28th of June, the following narrative had been 
presented to the Russian audience: “Americans and the West, following them, claim to 
fight against terrorist Caliphate and it appears they bomb someone, somewhere. In 
reality though ISIS is now acting not as a terrorist group but as a state, with its own 
foreign trade … selling it to buyers in the West” (VN, 28/06/2018, 1:10:43).  
During the first months of Russian intervention, nearly every Sunday	 news 
report from Syria reaffirmed this idea: “Americans and their fake ATC dare to blame 
Assad for hypocrisy” (VN, 20/09/2015, 12:53), “there are two coalitions – fake one, 
that allowed terrorist to advance and effective one, led by Putin, whether Americans 
like its action or not” (VN, 27/09/2015, 4:15), “the USA failed to achieve any visible 
results, may be because they bomb wrong side, in a wrong place and time?” (VN, 
27/09/2015, 33:55), “if the coalition really wants to fight against ISIS?” (VN, 
11/10/15, 31:15), “The American goal is to get rid of Assad, ours is to get rid of 
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terrorists” (VN, 25/10/2015, 39:56), and “nobody wanted to fight with terrorists for 
real” (VN, 21/02/2016, 3:56). 
It is clear that for the Russian narrative, the issue of “truth” against “lie” is one 
at the very heart. It appears that, for the Russian leadership, it was important to present 
Russia not just as another force or great power projecting its interests but as a party to a 
conflict which acts based on a higher moral standard than its rivals. The following 
chapter of the thesis will discuss the potential logic behind such a particular way to treat 
the conflict. However, before this, one has to uncover other elements of the Russian 
narrative 
  
2.3	“Those	who	can”	and	“Those	who	can	not”	
Another opposition between the Russian self and the ‘other’ is connect with the 
“truth against lie” problem but differs in its conclusions. As it was discussed before in 
the Russian frame, key attention has been attached to the problem of the difference 
between Russian and Western actions against ISIS. The first half of the Russian 
argument presumes that Western coalition simply only pretends to fight ISIS, however 
its second half implies that the West is also incapable of completing the mission to 
defeat terrorists and therefore it needs the help of Russia. 
In particular, this discourse can be observed in the statements such as: “there are 
no efficient actions against ISIS yet” (VN, 13/09/15, 10:20), the “fate of both Russia 
and Europe depends on Russian actions in Syria” (VN, 13/09/15, 25:31), “Europe can 
not see the true picture in Syria” (VN, 20/09/15, 10:19), “Europe is standing in front of 
the problem it cannot solve” (VN, 4/10/2015, 3:23),  “for the 4th time in its history 
Russia saves Europe” (VN, 4/10/2015, 31:08), “the USA fails to do the job [winning 
against ISIS]” (VN, 4/10/2015, 33:55) etc. Or, as was stated by the Russian president, 
"it is with the participation of the Russian military men that the Syrian Army and the 
patriotic forces of Syria managed to cardinally stem the tide in the fight against 
international terrorism and gain momentum in all directions" (Izvestia, 2016). 
Connected with this part of the narrative is the depiction of the migration crisis 
in Europe. Though this depiction is subject for separate research, there are several 
points to be made concerning the image of Europe as an actor, incapable of dealing with 
its problems. First, reports regarding the migration crisis are usually followed, or 
	 33	
preceded, by reports from Syria and were often as long. For example, on the 20th of 
September, a week before Russian intervention began, a report about the refugee threat 
was 20 minutes long – only 4 minutes longer than a report about Syria. Secondly, 
migrants are always presented as forces of chaos, destruction and panic. Thirdly, within 
the Russian narrative this chaos is exclusively the result of US activity in the Middle 
East: “Refugees flee to Europe not from Assad but from terrorists who are encouraged 
by the USA to fights against the legitimate government in Damascus” (VN, 13/09/2015, 
13:04) “Obama pushes the lines of refugees towards Europe” (VN, 13/09/2015, 13:40).  
In contrast to the “truth-fake” opposition, the idea of an incompetent West is 
different from the perspective of potential actions morally available to Russia. First and 
foremost, it has allowed Russia to make room for dialog and cooperation with the West 
within its discourse. Being completely out of the question before the intervention has 
launched this call for unity with the West has become integral part of the Russian 
narrative after the operation has been launched. How this idea has become integrated in 
the discussed oppositions is the subject of the next part of the chapter. 
 
Ethical narratives summary 
After the reconstruction of the ethical elements in the Russian narrative of its 
intervention in the Syrian civil war, a general image of the Russian self can be created. 
This thesis summarizes it in the following way: “we are those who can prevail over 
evil because we are honest and just and therefore good”. In contrast to pragmatic 
narratives, this image of self has been present during the entire period of observation 
and could be considered a central pillar of the Russian intervention narrative as a whole. 
Therefore, the operation in Syria from the perspective of the Russian narrative is clearly 
not about pragmatism, but rather an area where the Russian self can present itself to the 
world. 
However, as in any system of discourse, it is not enough to determine what is 
“self” and who is the significant ‘other,’ especially when the ‘other’ is not 
homogeneous. It is equally important how communication between the two is possible. 
Consequently, the next question for analysis is how the Russian “self” is connected with 
the international environment and what it wants from its partners within the Russian 
narrative.  
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Part	III.	“Diplomatic	narrative”	
 
The Russian intervention in Syria has happened not in vacuum, but in an 
international context. As it was discussed in the previous part, this context from the 
Russian narrative perspective is filled with fakes, insincerity, evil powers that spread 
chaos around the world, or incompetent partners. However, in such a context, the 
Russian narrative of its interaction with this world proves to not be based exclusively on 
conflict. Instead, two main elements of the diplomatic narrative Russian media and 
officials have been advocating since the very beginning of operation are “openness to 
cooperation” and “return to international norms of law.” In the following part, these 
narratives will be presented and analyzed in terms of their connection with the Russian 
self – revealed previously. 
 
3.1	Russian	openness	towards	cooperation	
 
For a country that considers itself to be the bearer of truth in a world of fakes, 
Russia has been, to a certain extent, counter intuitively open towards cooperation in 
Syria and eager to emphasize that even the decision to intervene has not been taken in a 
context of isolation. 
The first part in a “Russian openness” narrative regards Russian diplomatic 
activity. During September 27th, a broadcast show runner listed the diplomatic activity 
of the Russian president for 5 minutes straight, which might have been connected with 
the Russian decision to intervene. The way it was presented, one event quickly after 
another, leaves no doubt that it was important to show how Russian intervention is 
connected with diplomatic influence and connectedness with other countries that Russia 
has. Characteristic of this is the interpretation of one of the calls between Vladimir Putin 
and Barack Obama: “Obama calls Putin, again, - done with the isolation” (VN, 
27/09/2015, 6:41). Further, in the same report, Russian-American contact has been 
highlighted again: “meeting with Obama, whom we did not have to ask for it, is in 
Putin’s schedule” (VN, 27/09/2015, 16:05).  
The second element of an “openness narrative” has been a repeating theme 
throughout the period of observation – Russian eagerness to cooperate with the USA in 
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particular. On October 4th, 2015 it was claimed that “our [Russian] and American 
positions became closer – this is good” (VN, 4/10/2015, 14:01). The following week, 
the Russian deputy minister of defense was cited as saying: “let us [Russian and US 
military] stop talking through media, let us sit together and solve the problem that we 
are facing” (VN, 4/10/2015, 20:50) with a show runner lamenting, “we invite 
Americans to coordinate our efforts, however they refuse and risk finding themselves 
in isolation” (20:50), “we are open for coordinated work and it is time to join us” 
(VN, 4/10/2015, 31:04). The week after this, the main report from Syria had a title 
“Russia and the USA – moment of truth” reiterating that “Russia calls the USA to unite 
the efforts in order to find the political solution to conflict in Syria” (VN, 11/10/2015, 
13:49). Later, Dmitrii Kisilev claimed, “Syria can become a model for cooperation in 
other cases” (VN, 11/10/2015, 43:11). On the 15th of November, the same hope was 
expressed, “can we do it [defeat ISIS] together?” (VN, 15/11/2015, 15:59), and the 
same on November 22nd, “will a joint response to ISIS threat emerge”? (VN, 
22/11/20150:11). However, for the following two months this narrative had altogether 
disappeared. It seemed that what Russia wanted the most was an alliance, or at least 
friendly cooperation with the USA. However, it was not happening, and the explanation 
for the failure of this cooperation is of a very particular kind, according to Russian 
media. 
As it was discussed previously, the general image of the USA in the Russian 
narrative is one of the “chaotic force that spreads destruction.” With such a force it 
would be unreasonable to seek cooperation, but not according to Russian media. What 
is blocking cooperation at this time is not the spread of chaos on its own, but the way 
these actions are performed – from the position of an actor that has a moral right to do 
so without considering the Russian opinion on matters in question. In fact, parallel to 
the calls for cooperation, the Russian narrative highlights what is wrong in American 
behavior. Some of the most characteristic examples are as such: “we cannot accept the 
‘chosen’ character of American politics” (VN, 4/10/2015, 28:39), “Obama, who once 
called Americans the chosen nation, now is not even able to formulate the goals of his 
policy” (VN, 18/10/15, 16:35), “we cannot have a dialog with the politics based on the 
idea of being chosen” (VN, 25/10/2015, 43:11).  
	 36	
According to Russian interpretation, such exclusiveness means the ability to act 
with no constraints; to act by breaking the “rules of the game.” Instead, Russia must act 
in the world where there is a need to “return in the framework of international law those 
actors who are used to the fact that only they create the rules” (VN, 25/10/2015, 20:88). 
Before Russia interfered in Syria, “Americans were used to the world where they can 
afford to break agreements without any consequences, refuse to negotiate, destroy 
countries, lie in the Security Council” (VN, 25/10/2015, 21:11). This is the main reason 
behind any Russian-American conflict according to Russian media, “Putin does not 
allow [the USA] to destroy countries … prevents the USA from controlling the world, 
because he himself is not giving up” (VN, 31/01/16, 14:55). 
Within Russian discourse, the “rules of the game” are connected with 
international law, or at least with the way Russia understands it: “[we support] the idea 
of the common rules of the game, commitment to what international law is” (VN, 
4/10/2015, 28:55). It was highlighted on several occasions in Russian media that, in 
contrast to the US-led coalition, the one lead by Russia acts within legal constraints For 
example: “Putin’s actions are in perfect compliance with Russian and international law” 
(VN, 4/10/2015, 9:22); “the moral and legal purity of our decisions” (VN, 4/10/2015, 
11:29); “[Americans can join us] in order to make their actions legal” (VN, 
11/10/2015, 31:04). 
A clear direction toward dialog with the USA in the Russian narrative returned 
with new strength in February 2016, a month before the first “end” of Russian 
intervention occured. On the 14th of February, a primary report from Syria was titled 
“Russia – the USA: looking for solution.” According to Russian media, it became 
possible because Russian status in the eyes of the USA had changed. In particular, the 
“[Americans] themselves decided to interact with Russia as with a real power, because 
all other alternatives have failed” (VN, 14/02/2016, 13:59). A status changed occurred 
at this time, though not because the USA believed in Russia’s superior moral position, 
but because Russian actions were effective. “We [Russia] achieved progress both in the 
fight against terrorist and in finding common ground with the USA … obviously these 
two things are connected with each other” (VN, 14/02/2016, 13:5916:11), “already in 
October, right after the launch of Russian operations in Syria, Putin suggested 
coordination between the Russian and American militaries – the American side has 
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been resisting, but now in view of the risk of a big war and clear successes of Russia, 
they had to sit with us in front of the military maps” (VN,  28/02/2016, 12:46). But 
Russian success was not only on the battle ground and, for the following three minutes, 
the report presented a non-stop stream of phone calls and negotiations on Syria matter 
happened with Russian participation, which a show-runner labeling it as a “diplomatic 
push” and “diplomatic marathon.” Summarizing this push, the Russian media claims: 
“we had to achieve the moment when joint actions with the USA become possible … 
we had to persuade Americans not only through negotiations” (VN, 28/02/2016, 21:21). 
Moreover, while discussing joint Russian-American action, the Russian narrative goes 
as far as labeling “American crimes” in Iraq, Libya as calmly for Russian narrative as 
possible, as “deeds of the past – experience” (VN, 14/02/2016, 15:51). 
While summarizing the role and place of the USA in the Russian narrative of 
Syrian intervention, the following logic emerges. From the very beginning, Russia 
wanted common rules that would guide the policies of all countries, however the 
existing rules would not work due to the American exceptionalism. In such a world, the 
only thing left for Russia is to support its position by force and, instead of good will, 
“force” is working. 
 
 
 
3.2	“Reasonable	force”	
The idea of “working force” in its connection with international norms is the 
final constitutive part of the “diplomatic” portion of the Russian narrative regarding the 
Syrian civil war. Such a force is the continuation of Russian understanding of itself, as 
discussed previously. Being the power that protects, is honest, and is capable of dealing 
with global threats, Russia offers rules for the game, which, from its perspective, are 
alternative to American.  
The key difference is the supposed inclusion of all parties interested in a 
problem – not through actions themselves but through way of acting. In fact, the 
conflict “inclusion” vs. “exclusion” can be traced through most of the reports. The 
Russian intervention happened after “we listened to everybody and took into account 
the interests of all parties involved” (VN, 4/10/2015, 9:30). In contrast to the USA, 
	 38	
according to the Russian president, “we were not warned by anybody [about the start of 
anti-ISIS operations of the US], but we did it” (VN, 11/10/2015, 30:55). As the result of 
Russian actions, “the world, which was slipping into chaos, became more balanced and 
therefore safe” (VN, 25/10/2015, 21:35).  
Here, one can find reference to the oppositions of “honesty vs. hypocrisy” and 
“chaos vs. order,” both crucial for defining the Russian self. Indeed, while investigating 
the Russian narrative, one can often create an image that Russia is against any global 
and international element of modern world. However, it appears to be more 
complicated. Russia is not against global trends, rather it is only against those that 
ignore what is called within its narrative the “traditional way of life.” In that respect, the 
Russian approach resists such global processes as democratization (Arab spring) and 
rapid social changes connected with it (progressive agenda of LGBT-rights, etc) while 
instead seeking a more dispersed global community where different “way of lives” can 
coexist with no one being given moral superiority. Attempts to promote the first 
approach are never fruitful and only lead to chaos and are therefore “irresponsible” and 
evil. The only alternative to it, from a Russian perspective, is communication between 
different ways of thinking, and this approach is the one Russia offers to the world. 
Furthermore, according to the Russian narrative, the only way to defeat ISIS is 
through genuine international cooperation. This narrative can also be traced through the 
entire period of observation: “humanitarian catastrophe can be stopped only if the whole 
world unites” (VN, 13/09/2015, 28:31), “our goal is to unite efforts in the fight against a 
common enemy” (VN, 27/09/2015, 11:41) etc. What is clear from these calls is the way 
Russian leadership understands conflict and terrorism – as an opportunity to cooperate.  
In sum, the “diplomatic narratives” of Russian intervention in Syria are 
essentially connected with “ethical” ones. These narratives show how the Russian “self” 
is capable of communicating with the others. What is crucial, from the perspective of 
the thesis, is the element of supposed openness in the narrative. A desire to be talked to 
and desire to be seen is not typically the goal of a nation that seeks to become 
domestically as closed from Western influence as possible. In the concluding part of 
this chapter, the revealed narrative and oppositions will be summarized to enable easier 
analysis of the revealed narrative, not just from the perspective observed in Russian 
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media, but in a broader context of other events that happened before and after Russian 
intervention in the Syrian civil war. 
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Summary	
 
The table below presents the results of primary data analysis. In this chapter, this 
information has been addressed in a purely descriptive manner, in order to understand 
the narrative as it is.  
 
Table 1. The official narrative of Russian Intervention in Syria 
 
Type of 
Considerations 
Russian “Self” Russian 
opponent/ 
enemy 
Russian goal, derived from the 
logic 
Pragmatic Protector of 
Homeland 
ISIS To defeat ISIS before it 
becomes capable of attacking 
Russia 
Strong military 
power 
Those who do 
not believe in it 
To train Russian army, to 
make those who do  do not believe 
in it see it 
Ethical Honesty Hypocrisy To be (?) 
 Order, Good Chaos, Evil, 
ISIS, USA 
Capable power Weak hypocrites To protect the weak, who 
suffer from hypocrisy (?) 
Diplomatic Openness, 
compliance 
with rules and 
norms 
US 
Exceptionalism 
To break diplomatic isolation, 
to become accepted as equal 
by the USA 
Dialog Actions without 
considerations of 
others’ interests 
To demonstrate the need to 
change the rules of the game 
to make them more inclusive  
 
As it follows from the table, it is difficult to define one purpose of Russian 
intervention in Syria even from within the Russian narrative. The dispersion between 
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the goals and the possibility to achieve them in principle is striking. However, it is 
important to point out that within this discourse, any Russian actions can be explained 
as a step towards one goal or the other.   
What is the most difficult to define is the potential ethical goals of Russian 
intervention. Therefore, in the table there are question marks next to each suggested 
aim. A certain paradox appears. On the one hand, based on the frequency of references 
towards ethical considerations, as well as its central place in the narrative, it is clearly a 
crucial element in the Russian narrative of intervention in Syria. On the other hand, 
based on the data openly presented in Russian media, it is hard to tell what Russia wants 
from its action. What could be a tangible result that would satisfy Russian leadership? 
Finally, it is clear even from the Russian narrative itself that intervention in 
Syria was, for the most part, not about Syria. One can accept that Russia genuinely 
wanted to stop ISIS and help Bashar Assad, though several times Russian leadership 
expressed readiness to accept free democratic elections in Syria after the terrorist threat 
will be eradicated –most notably in the statement on this account made in 2012 by 
Russian Foreign minister Sergei Lavrov (which was never revoked). However, even in 
that case, other considerations of its relationship with the West are more important to 
Russian leadership. From that perspective, problems in Syria serve as context for more 
general arguments that Russia has with the current system.  
Consequently, to get a deeper understanding of what meaning the intervention in 
Syria had for Russian leadership in 2015, one has to go deeper into descriptive analysis. 
In the next chapter, the revealed findings will be analyzed in the context of existing 
literature on Russian foreign policy and Russian identity in its relations to foreign 
policy decisions. 
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Chapter	III.	Russian	Narrative	in	context	
 
In the previous chapter, the Russian narrative of intervention in the Syrian civil 
war has been analyzed exclusively from its own perspective. In this part of the thesis, 
the same narrative will be considered in the context of existing literature as well as 
theories of international relations. The ultimate goal of this chapter is to understand 
what the conducted analysis can add to the existing research and, consequently, how it 
can broaden understanding of the motivation behind Russian foreign policy. 
 
Realist	considerations	
In terms of international relations theories, one potential interpretation of the 
revealed narrative is the treatment of a Russian legitimation campaign as a rhetorical 
action. The Institute for the Study of War – a nongovernmental American think tank – 
has been tracking all Russian airstrikes in Syria and have revealed that the absolute 
majority of them was directed, not against ISIS, but against the armed Syrian 
opposition. From the perspective of the Institute, this gap between claimed policies and 
real actions can be explained in the following way: “The Kremlin framed its 
intervention in Syria as a response to the growing threat posed by ISIS, recognizing that 
the terrorist group posed a joint threat to Russia and the West. This false yet plausible 
narrative allowed Russia to curtail the West’s ability to unite against Russia’s efforts to 
bolster President Assad and project military force in the Middle East…Moscow’s 
decision to disguise its intervention in Syria as a response to ISIS is an example of the 
Russian doctrine of reflexive control: the use of disinformation to alter an opponent’s 
perception of events and lead the adversary to respond in a manner that ultimately 
favors Russia” (Institute for the Study of War, 2015). Another realist explanation 
suggests: “Russia’s deployment of military might to Syria is a tactical move to protect 
its client and ally, Syrian President Bashar Assad” (Covington, 2015). What is more, the 
demonstration of power in Syria is nothing else but an attempt to deter western 
influence in the Middle East and impede the security system that has been built in the 
region by the USA and its allies – an idea that has been expressed by Angela Stent, for 
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example, “The Syrian gambit is thus part of a broader move to recoup Russian influence 
in the Middle East” (Stent, 2016). 
It is hard to argue, based on the revealed narrative, that Russia intended to save 
Bashar Assad. However, it is equally important that the motivation behind this 
protection was to save Russia’s client. In the Russian framework, Assad’s regime was 
worth saving only because it was fighting against absolute evil, supported by Western 
puppet masters. Consequently, this reasoning is based more on ethical considerations 
and not just on geo-political gambits. Moreover, should one remain within the realist 
logic, even more questions emerge. For example, if, for Russia, the support of Bashar 
Assad’s regime is so important, then why did Russia not voice any concrete 
commitment towards keeping Assad in power should the pro-governmental forces win 
the war in Syria? 
At the same time, if fighting against ISIS was so important to Russia as it 
claimed, then the level of its unpreparedness during the first six months of the operation 
puts the sincerity of these claims into question. For example, once, right after the start 
of military operation, Vladimir Putin claimed "we make no difference between Sunnies 
and Shias" (BBC, 2015). Additionally, a second statement was made during a press-
conference in December 2015, a month after Turkey shot down a Russian jet that 
violated its airspace while bombing the positions of local militia supported by Turkey 
(since they were Turcoman people – ethnically related to Turks). The Russian president 
had only the comment, “you know, we did not know a thing about so-called Turcoman. 
I know about Turkmen people, our dear Turkmen people, living in Turkmenistan, and 
here we do not understand a thing [PS] nobody told us a thing” (Putin, 2015). 
It proves even more complicated within the realist paradigm to explain the 
element of “openness for cooperation with the West and the USA,” while also 
portraying the USA as the reason behind the emergence of this global evil – ISIS. 
Moreover, this duality is a re-occurring theme in the relationship between Russia and 
the West: “why does Russia use such strong language as presenting Western nations at 
one time as “brothers” and “friends,” while at other times castigating them for 
“betraying” the established principles and agreements?” (Tsygankov, 2014, 347). From 
a data perspective, while analyzing the Syrian intervention narrative present in media, it 
is revealed that this duality is the crucial element of the Russian understanding of the 
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conflict in Syria and global politics in general. Therefore, it cannot be dismissed as a 
mere propaganda tool as political realism would suggest.  Alternative explanations must 
be found, particularly within other approaches to international relations which analyze 
the importance of “identity” and “self” and how it correlates with the image discovered 
previously through the analysis of primary data. 
 
Social	constructivism	on	the	Russian	“self”	and	“being	right”	in	international	
relations	
 
The most common premise concerning Russian foreign policy post-cold war is 
the assumption that its primary focus has been the restoration of the country’s influence 
and status in international affairs (Kanet, 2007; Trenin, 2011; Tsygankov, 2005, Stent, 
2014). However, any issue of status is an issue of symbolic communication, and Russia 
is a paradox from this perspective. According to Volgy et al., Russia constitutes a 
unique category, being a country that believes itself to be a great power without all the 
capacities of one. What is special about Russia is that, in contrast to other over-
achieving status-inconsistent countries that are afraid of losing this status and tend not 
to take high-risk action (Volgy et al., 2011, p.11-12), Russia clearly conducts highly 
confrontational foreign policy, being constantly involved in armed conflicts as of 2014, 
and having previous involvement even in 2008. 
To begin with, under Vladimir Putin, symbolic politics in Russia’s foreign 
policy agenda have become a central pillar, putting issues of security or the economy 
aside (Forseberg, Heller, Wolf, 2013). Moreover, many scholars consider the lack of 
status recognition and respect from the partner-countries to be one of the main reasons 
of crisis in Russia-West relations, which results in the current crisis of trust (Monaghan, 
2008; Sakwa, 2008; Stent, 2014; Tsygankov, 2012). Before the crisis in Ukraine, 
Vincent Pouliot proposed that “if NATO wants Russia to play by the rules of the 
security-from-the-inside-out game, it should provide enough cultural-symbolic 
resources to have a minimally successful hand in the game” (Pouliot, 2010, p. 239). 
Furthermore, as Jeffrey Mankoff argues “a Russia that is sure of itself and its standing 
in the world is likely to make a more stable, predictable partner for the West” (Mankoff, 
2007, p. 133). Such an importance attached to the West is not coincidental. As Ted 
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Hopf argues, identities are always relational and “the Self and the Other are mutually 
necessary…identities can only be understood relationally, we can not know what an 
identity is without relating it to another” (Hopf, 2002). In the context of war this also 
means that, before a nation resorts to violence in order to protect certain values or 
defend certain interests, it has to build an image of what those interests are. And such an 
understanding emerges only as a result of interaction with others or reflections on the 
previous experiences of such an interaction. 
Generally in agreement with the statement of Amrosio (“Russia seeks to be 
respected as a great power because of deep seated beliefs about its own identity and its 
place in the world” (Ambrosio, 2005, p. viii)), this thesis also suggest looking deeper 
into the meaning of “being a great power.” Indeed the notion of Great Power is not self-
explanatory, especially in the context of the Russian intervention into the Syrian civil 
war, and must be conceptualized.  
One instrumental definition of a great power is provided by Ivar Neumann: “on 
the one hand, [great powers] are simply greater in terms of relative resources … and, on 
the other hand, they are prestigious due to some superior moral quality.” (Neumann, 
2008, 131). But, “what is special about modern Russia is that, in contrast to other over-
achieving status-inconsistent countries that are afraid of losing this status and tend not 
to take high-risk action,” (Volgy et al., 2011, p.11-12) the “Russian Federation is an 
overachiever, enjoying a Great power status without having the capabilities of a Great 
power” (Freire, 2011, p. 74). Therefore, one has to investigate what being a Great 
Power means to Russia. As noted by Anatoliy Reshetnikov, “if the ideological 
undertone of the Soviet “great projects” was rather explicit, the current ones seem to be 
anything but ideologically coherent” (Reshetnikov, 2011, 152). The content of a 
particular discourse of the Russian “self” in the context of war in Syria, as discussed in 
the previous chapter, suggests that “honor” is not the best way to define Russian 
understanding of the “great power” as an element of its identity. Instead, one can see a 
clear emphasis on what is labeled as “being right/good/honest” and therefore “being 
great”.  
Perhaps the most established, theoretical way to approach the phenomenon of 
the desire of “being right” can be found in the so-called “logic of appropriateness.” A 
classical study of the logics of action in international relations can be found in the 
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article of Thomas Risse “‘Let’s Argue!’: Communicative action in World Politics” 
(Risse, 2000). In his, research Risse defines three logics of action. The first one is the 
logic of consequence, which “treats the interests, and the preferences of actors as mostly 
fixed during the process of interaction” (Risse, 2000, 3). Consequently, in this logic of 
action, “agents participate on the basis of their given identities and interests and try to 
realize their preferences through strategic behavior” (Risse, 2000, 3). In contrast to the 
logic of consequences, the logic of appropriateness presumes that: “human actors are 
imagined to follow rules that associate particular identities to particular situations, 
approaching individual opportunities for action by asserting similarities between current 
identities and choice dilemmas and more general concepts of self and situations” (Risse, 
2000, 4). In terms of the logic of international relations, appropriateness would also 
imply following the norms of the international community. And indeed, in the Russian 
narrative of the intervention in Syria, the importance attached to the idea of “global 
rules of the game,” as well as anger and disdain towards powers that destroy these rules, 
is strongly traceable.  
Another possible answer to this question is one of honor: “the concept of honor 
is often at the heart of how a nation expresses its historical experience and formulates a 
moral purpose in world politics. Honor defines what is a “good” and “virtuous” course 
of action for a state vis-à-vis other members of international society” (Tsygankov, 
2012,20). Ted Hopf highlighted the dependency of “great power” identity on 
international recognition and hierarchical identity structures (Hopf, 2002, 190). 
However, as we’ve seen before, for Russia the norms of international law are 
valid only as long as Russia is involved in the process of its creation. It is clear that the 
Russian “desire to be right” cannot be explained by the logic of appropriateness on a 
level of formal rules-following behavior. What is more, within “being right” in the 
Russian discourse, morality and legality goes hand in hand. Such a correlation in 
regards to foreign policy, as well as such a strong belief in what Ivar Neuman would 
call “superior moral quality” (Neumann, 2008, 131), could not exist within the 
traditional logic of appropriateness. There should have been a rhetorical model to 
support such a belief, and this thesis would argue that such a model is the model of a 
“just war” or even a “holy war.” In the following part of the thesis, the origins of this 
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model will be demonstrated, as well as the parallels and references between the model 
and the discourse of Russian intervention in Syria. 
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Fight	to	be	right?	
Rhetorical	model	of	War		
War has always been an integral part of Russian identity, but in the 20th century 
the historical myth of the Great Patriotic War has become “the most important 
component in defining the identity of the Soviet peoples” (Uldricks, 2009, 60). This war 
can be considered an equivalent to moral purpose and is essential for a community’s 
existence (Reus-Smit, 2009). What is more, the way the Great Patriotic war is 
constructed in modern Russia differs from other countries.  
In particular, the Russian mainstream avoids talking about the period of 1939-
1941 before the German invasion due to the problematic issue of Soviet-German 
cooperation during this period. Therefore, the main adjective for the German invasion is 
“sudden” and “traitorous” as if it appeared out of nothing as a force of nature. 
Moreover, WWII is basically considered in Russian society (its mainstream) as a  
"sacred value" (Baron, Spranca, 1997; Atran, 2010; Durkheim, 1912, 1995), the 
acceptance of which by the third party constitutes clear distinction in the "friend-
enemy" dichotomy in which Russian people conceptualize modern internal and external 
political life. Furthermore, WWII possesses absolute moral value precisely because of 
its essence – the salvation of millions of lives of innocent people from extermination in 
concentration camps.  
At the same time, civilian suffering during WWII allowed the Russian Great 
Patriotic War narrative to label any attempt to discuss the problem of post-war 
occupation of Eastern Europe, or Soviet Union responsibility for the conflict, as a 
means to rehabilitate Nazism. In that sense, Eastern European nations existed only to be 
saved by the red army, with no agency of its own. In a summarized way, the chain of 
metaphors of the Great Patriotic War are: “an evil force has come out of nowhere from 
outside into some territory – civilians are suffering in this territory – Russia appears 
and saves the day no matter how much the West damages its efforts”. 
From this discourse a very particular image of war can be derived. First and 
foremost, the language of war in Russia is not the language of national interest 
discourse that follows a utilitarian logic of consequence, but instead is the language of 
justice and truth – the language of the logic of appropriateness. Furthermore, war, the 
way Russia interprets it, has a very particular value – it allows the country to do 
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something that is morally good and right. And, finally, by being good in a “holy war,” 
the Russian discursive model manages to prevent the discussion or criticism of the 
“dark pages” of Russian history and politics.  
In many ways the revealed discursive model of the Russian intervention in Syria 
correlates with the model of a “holy war” as discussed above. Russia acts as a savior of 
innocent Syrian people, who are threatened by the force of chaos – terrorism. Such 
behavior is of “unprecedented moral and legal purity” (VN, 4/10/2015, 9:44). 
Moreover, there were direct references to the experience of WWII in the reports: the 
“current coalition is an anti-Hitler one” (VN, 4/10/2015, 30:50). Russian actions in 
Syria have repeatedly been described as just, honest, and pure with Russia being “good” 
fighting against “evil”. And following this discursive framework of a “holy war,” evil 
simply must exist so that Russia can fight it and to be praised for it.  
Again, it is easy to label the Russian war narrative as a mere disinformation 
method, however the Russian elite and society may in fact share the belief that it is 
through a “just war” that Russia manifests its moral superiority. If a “just war” narrative 
and desire to be morally strong is what stands behind Russian aggressive behavior, then 
it is possible to make several conclusions about the way Russia sees itself in the 
international system and the system itself.  
The narrative of a just war being considered as having real value beyond simple 
propaganda can provide an alternative insight into the objectives of Russian foreign 
policy. One crucial problem for Russia is international recognition in a form that Russia 
considers acceptable. Further investigation is required to understand what was missing 
in Russian-West relations during the first two of Putin’s presidencies. It is clear that 
Russia does not necessarily want to follow the rules, and instead wants to set them. 
However, this desire to be constitutive of the post-cold war order as a whole is precisely 
one of the properties of the Great power that Russia considers itself to be.  
Ted Hopf has pointed out that, on the international level, to be a great power 
means to comply with a “set of oughts and ought nots” while dealing with other 
countries. And from the Russian perspective, this set of rules may include the right to 
wage “just wars” even against a background of condemnation from the international 
community. In fact, going beyond the established set of rules and having the ability to 
establish and interpret them in a convenient way is the definitive feature of great power 
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in the current international order, as the only true great power (from the Russian 
perspective), the USA, did in Iraq, Kosovo, and Ukraine. Even in 2002 Hopf argued that 
“the only external force capable of affecting Russian discourse in the nearest future after 
1999 is US unilateralism” (Hopf, 2002, 269), and apparently such an effect did take 
place. 
What can help to understand the mechanism of the problem between Russia and 
the West is the work of Janice Mattern, which is focused on the mechanisms that enable 
the functioning of a security community – a group of states that can trust each other to 
not use force to settle disputes between them (Mattern, 2001, p.349). In contrast to other 
security community theorists, like Karl Deutsch and Adler and Barnett, who were 
interested in whether or not security communities exist, Mattern is focused on the 
question of how they work. She is not satisfied with an explanation that power plays a 
minor role in a security community, being substituted by a “we-identity”. For Mattern, 
one the key properties of a security community is still power and force – not physical, 
but rather representational. Mattern points out that security communities function 
through language, with the power to define the content of “we-identity” being no less 
strong than that of physical force. Identity formation entails oppression and power: the 
“authority to determine what to include and exclude from the “we” by conferring, 
deterring or denying the relevance of certain knowledge to the community” (Mattern, 
2001, p.354). This representational force is no less powerful or mentally painful for an 
object who is threatened to be excluded from such a “we-community.” In other words, 
“the forceful power is not excluded from the security community – nor by extension 
from any regime dependent upon identity” (Mattern, 2001, p. 387). 
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Two	logics	of	international	
As revealed in the previous chapter, throughout all discourse of the intervention 
in Syria, Russian media has been emphasizing the honesty of Russian politics in 
contrast to Western politics. Consequently, one can interpret the key problem in 
Russia’s relationship with the West, from the Russian perspective, as the problem of 
dialog. In short, Russia seeks to be understood by the West for what it is, and to get 
what it deserves. The discursive model of a “just war” helps to understand what kind of 
dialogue Russia seeks with the West. 
Indeed, if praise and acceptance is what Russia seeks to achieve, there should be 
a non-evil “other” that could praise Russia for its noble deeds. Within the Russian 
narrative of the intervention in Syria such an “other” exists – Europe. A Europe that is 
incapable of solving its problems on its own; incapable of protecting itself. As Dmitrii 
Kisiliov claimed in October 2015, right after the operation began, “for the fourth time in 
its history Russia saves Europe from enslavement and barbarism: Mongols, Napoleon, 
Hitler, ISIS” (VN, 4/10/2015, 31:08). Consequently, Russian foreign politics is 
narratively rooted in the desire to be praised by the international community in general 
and the West in particular. However, what the analysis of the Syrian intervention 
discourse reveals is that Russian leadership understands this praise and respect in a very 
particular way.  
As part of the “order against chaos” narrative, the collocation of a “traditional 
way of life” has been used multiple times: the “Arab spring has destroyed the traditional 
way of life in the region” (VN, 28/06/2015, 16:50); “the USA has acted without 
responsibility, destroying countries and the way of life of entire regions” (VN, 
13/12/15, 13:16) etc. In the framework of the discussed narrative this “way of life” 
should be read as Russian opposition towards a globalist understanding of 
“international,” which Russian discourse traditionally has associated with the USA, 
European Union, and the whole discourse around “human rights.”  
The rejection of any revolution against a legitimate government has been the 
cornerstone of Russian arguments with its Western partners for a decade. In fact, “the 
consequences of Color Revolutions were regarded by the Russian elite as the result of 
the United States' and the EU's foreign policies” (Gretskiy et al., 2014, 382). In 
February 2011, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev talking about the Arab Spring 
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revolutions explained them as being “instigated by outside forces” and warned: “Let's 
face the truth. They [the West] have been preparing such a scenario for us [Russia], and 
now they will try even harder to implement it” (Freedman, 2011). In 2014, during a 
meeting with his advisory Security Council, Vladimir Putin stated: "We see what tragic 
consequences the wave of so-called color revolutions led to… for us, this is a lesson and 
a warning. We should do everything necessary so that nothing similar ever happens in 
Russia" (Reuters. 2014). 
Here lies a certain paradox. Within its own discourse, and while talking to an 
international audience, Russia always presents itself as a true proponent of international 
cooperation and international law, while strongly resisting any unilateralism. As it was 
revealed before, Russia highlights the legality of its presence in Syria, and through it 
Russian loyalty to the system of international law. However, within the very same 
discourse, Russia strongly opposes any truly global and transnational processes. From 
the Russian perspective, this logic is strongly associated with the idea of liberal values, 
which Russia regards as hypocrisy. One characteristic example that helps to illustrate 
this idea is the Russian media’s reaction towards Barack Obama’s speech to the United 
Nation Security council on September 29th. In particular, the American president 
expressed a dream of a world in which any girl anywhere can go to school. This quite 
innocent proposition had provoked an outbreak of nothing short of rage from Dmitrii 
Kisiliev: “the USA has entered the Middle East, destabilized it [Arab spring], left chaos 
and left … but Obama tells us about girls that should go to school. They should but it is 
not for Obama to bring them there using such means” (VN, 04/10/2015, 34:48). 
Against this background, Vladimir Putin in his speech in the UN, and Dmitrii Kisiliev 
in his show, have referenced multiple times what can be called Russian preferences: 
“bringing back order to the Middle East” (VN, 04/10/2015, 31:20); “support state 
institutions where they are left” (VN, 04/10/2015, 32:24); and “we can only pity states 
and peoples which were penetrated by the USA” (VN, 04/10/2015, 26:35).  
 Consequently, it appears that for the Russian leadership, ‘international’ means 
space that exists as a space between independent units – states. This space is regulated 
by a certain set of norms or “rules of the game,” and these rules are the subject of dialog 
and communication between these units. What Russia is truly against is the opposite 
logic of ‘international,’ which understands it as the space of transnational processes, 
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universal in its nature. As something that, in principle, goes beyond the state logic. For 
Russia, global processes and international process are two different things, with global 
process being a subject of control of any state within its own territory. Within the 
Russian paradigm, such things as “universal standards,” be it education, healthcare, 
LGBT-rights, or terrorism, do not exist. Or at least they exist only on a country level, 
with no international dimension. 
Therefore, within the Russian narrative, the universal logic of ‘international,’ as 
represented in 2015 by Barack Obama, is an ultimate enemy since it attempts to 
promote a liberal worldview as the only one morally acceptable, and this promotion is 
the basis for the international politics of the USA. Whereas for Russia, ‘international’ 
means an area where different worldviews, or “traditional ways of life” (as it appears 
in Syrian intervention discourse) are in dialog with each other. In other words, for 
Russia ‘international’ being understood as the sum of parts (states) does not result in a 
new entity bigger than this sum. 
However, another problem then appears for Russia from within this logic. While 
not necessarily seeking conflict with the opposing logic, Russia still sees the 
international arena as a sphere of communication and, consequently, one can say the 
Russian leadership indeed seeks dialog with its partners. However, it wants to be a 
moral equal in this dialog, rather than a student who is taught the “right” way of life. 
Even more, Russia wants to be seen in this dialogue by the significant other the same 
way Russia sees itself. As was discussed previously, this is the image of “savior,” of a 
strong and good and therefore “right” power.  
What is more such an innate understanding of international and war appears to 
be shared by Russian people and elite alike. According to polls conducted in March 
2015, 47% of Russian respondents preferred that the country be a great power which 
they conceptualize as one “respected and afraid of,” for the sake of the country’s 
economic well-being2. Even against the background of a deepening economic crisis in 
January 2016 36% of the population considered Russia to be a great power in the world, 
																																																								2	Levada	Center.	Press-release	“Positions	of	the	Russian	Federation	on	International	Arena”	(March,	23.	2015)	Accessed	10th	March,	2016	from	http://www.levada.ru/old/23-03-2015/pozitsii-rossii-na-mezhdunarodnoi-arene	
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compared with 27% in 20153. As I argued in my article “The fact is that, from the 
perspective of at least 30% of the Russian population, Russia being considered an 
enemy by most developed countries does not weaken their pride for the motherland but 
instead strengthens it. Even admitting that the country is economically weak compared 
with the West, people are proud that at least in terms of foreign policy capacities, Russia 
seems to be on equal footing” (Shchelin, 2016). 
Apparently, great powerness can be considered as one of the fundamental 
political myth of Russian society. Political myths are common in all modern countries 
(Smith, 1991; Hosking & Schöpflin, 1997) since they are the means to keep nations 
together, however not an every political myth is based on an idea of great power as it is 
in Russian case. As Hanna Smith (Smith, 2014, 361) argues “national unity had given a 
boost to Russian self-confidence and Russian great power identity had found its place in 
Russian domestic discourse”. 
Here it is possible to argue that Syria as another “just war” served as means for 
the Russian state to preserve the image of the country in the eyes of Russian citizens. 
Indeed, one of the primary social functions of war in the state of Modern to be the 
ultimate means of State visibility. This is the function of war usually forgotten, but in 
the Westphalia system of modern states it is in part through war how a modern state has 
prevailed over previous forms of government. The creation of massive armies where all 
soldiers, no matter the social class, were melted into a single body was one the key 
social mechanisms of the creation of the “imagined communities” of modern nations. 
War and the possibility of total war, such as WWI and WWII – that involves not only 
those who serve in the army but every citizen – has resulted in multiple social practices 
that permanently reinforce the coherence of the “nation-state” construct and allowing 
the suppression of the differences between the groups and community that otherwise 
would not be held together. Paraphrasing Charles Tilly’s statement – the modern state 
needs war but modern war does not need a modern state. On the contrary, an 
international disdain towards war as a political practice is a new phenomenon for a 
modern state. In fact, war used to be generally understood by policymakers in the way 																																																								3	Levada	Center.	Publication	“Nearly	half	of	Russians	think	that	the	West	sees	Russia	as	a	concurrent”	(February,	4,	2016)		Accessed	10th	March,	2016	from	http://www.levada.ru/2016/02/04/pochti-polovina-grazhdan-schitayut-chto-zapad-vidit-v-rossii-konkurenta/	
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Barkawi and Brighton state (Barkawi, Brighton, 2011, 126) “war is a generative force 
like no other. It is of fundamental significance for politics, society and culture ... War, 
the threat of war and the preparation for war mark the origins, transformation, and end 
of polities.” Moreover, as Jens Bartelson points out: “from the seventeenth to the early 
twentieth century, war has been saddled with an almost magical capacity to produce 
sociopolitical order out of its manifold negations, and has been involved in the shaping 
of actors and in the drawing of the boundaries separating them” (Bartelson, 2016). 
Such an understanding of war fits into the proposed concept of “just war” 
revealed during the analysis of the Russian narrative of intervention in Syria. Russian 
leadership clearly sees force and power as a visible mechanism in dialog both in the 
space of international communication, as well as during the process of presentation of 
Russia to Russian citizens – keeping Russian “imagined community” coherent. Indeed, 
as John Hutchinson points out “wars have significance when the experiences of conflict 
generate profound ideological-cultural cleavages and through their outcomes change the 
balance of power between rival conceptions of the nation” (Hutchinson, 2017, 49).  
Summing up, one can read Russian actions exclusively from within the logic of 
competition between great powers: they “sent strategic bombers on sorties over the 
country from bases in central Russia, and ordered the Russian navy to fire missiles at 
Syrian targets from positions in the Caspian and Mediterranean Seas. By doing so, 
Russia undermined the de facto monopoly on the global use of force that the United 
States has held since the collapse of the Soviet Union” (Trenin, 2016). In contrast, 
however, the very same action can also be read as an attempt to act accordingly to what 
one partner in the dialogue expects from an equal. It is not a coincidence that the 
opposition of “honesty vs. fake” is so vivid in Russian discourse of the Syrian 
intervention. Within the Russian discourse, the “global use of power” that Dmitrii 
Trenin writes about is not referring to interests, but instead refers to equality during 
communication practices. Russian resentment towards the current world order is not 
simply a result of feeling that some of its interest have been attacked, but because “they 
lied to us” (VN, 18/10/2015, 25:30). The USA is not Russia’s enemy, but it becomes 
one when there is “refusal to form a direct dialogue” (VN, 18/10/2015, 19:08) - one 
can add “dialogue with respect and as with an equal.” 
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Against such a background, the Syrian intervention and war in general acquires 
a very particular meaning. The Syrian intervention becomes an example of a “just war,” 
in which the main function is communicative. It is a certain kind of language used to 
remind Europe what Russia is from the Russian perspective, and to demand from 
Europe an adequate dialogue. War, therefore, is turned into a performance. Its function– 
to present oneself the way one perceives oneself, and to get the recognition one thinks 
one deserves unconditionally just for being.  
 
Social	function	of	war	
The proposed interpretation of the Russian intervention in Syria primarily helps 
to understand the paradox of the gap between Russian rhetoric and Russian actions 
during the first stage of the operation. If the logic behind the decision is one centered 
around the desire to “feel being right,” one can expect poor preparation of the operation 
from the perspective of the analysis of such a complex international phenomenon as the 
Syrian civil war. For example, if Russia really wanted to cooperate with the West and 
the USA over Syria in order to break its isolation after the war in Ukraine, then it should 
have shown commitment to the fight against ISIS and have proved its military 
capacities to win in this fight. This would have been the most reasonable and logical 
way to persuade Western partners. However, as it was shown by the Institute for the 
Study of War, during the first stage of Russian intervention, ISIS positions remained 
mostly untouched by Russian airstrikes despite the claims of Russian diplomats. US 
officials also estimated that only 10-30% of Russian airstrikes targeted ISIS (Guardian, 
2015). In fact, an air strike is not the kind of data that is easily hidden and would be 
more reasonable for Russian authorities to be consistent with, should they desire 
partnership with the USA. Moreover, the way the Russian military interfered in the 
Syrian conflict has resulted in little help on the ground for the Assad regime during first 
6 months of Russian involvement. Neither was the stability of the governmental regime 
promoted nor were terrorists' bases destroyed. Several operations inspired by the desire 
to create an image of success have lead to severe losses in other areas. One can treat this 
gap as an intentional deliberation, but at the same time it can be simply a sign of 
Russian unpreparedness. In short, Russia, following a logic that is not understood by the 
international community, has entered into a conflict where the interests of so many 
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actors are complexly intertwined. It has proven that the Russian army and Russian 
diplomacy was not and is not prepared to act in such an environment; that is why Russia 
keeps performing ad hoc policy without any strategic military reasoning.  
From the perspective of this thesis, what is even more important in this case is 
the way the social function of war has been changing in the Russian discourse of Syrian 
intervention. Instead of military aspects with battle plans and clear objectives, a 
performative element of warfare has entered the forefront. War instead has become the 
means to express one’s identity. The Russian intervention in Syria, within the Russian 
discourse, becomes a virtual war in the same way as Jean Baudrillard wrote of the Gulf 
war, meaning that with the help of virtual technologies the Gulf War had become a 
purely virtual war: “so war, when it has been turned into information, ceases to be a 
realistic war and becomes a virtual war, in some way symptomatic […] everything 
which is turned into information becomes the object of endless speculation, the site of 
total uncertainty” (Baudrillard 2001, 242). Paul Virilio shows that modern means of 
warfare: heat-seeking missiles, infra-red and laser guidance systems, warheads fitted 
with video cameras, are also a means of representation that marks “the complete 
evaporation of visual subjectivity into an ambient technical effect, a sort of permanent 
pan cinema. Which, unbeknown to us, turns our most ordinary acts into movie action, 
into new visual material, undaunted, undifferentiated vision-fodder… [of which the 
main aim is] a waning of reality: an aesthetics of disappearance…” (Virilio 1994, 47, 
49). 
This observation is closely connected with the discoveries of literature on such 
an element of modern warfare as media spectacle. It originates from political 
philosophy – in particular in the writings of Paul Virilio, Douglas Kellner, and Jean 
Baudrillard (Virilio, 2000, Kellner, 2003; Baudrillard, 2009) and presumes that with the 
development of military and television technologies, the reality of war has become 
separated from its image, turning armed conflicts into media spectacle solely designed 
for political ends. Chouliaraki has shown (Chouliaraki, 2006, 2013) how the 
performative function of the spectacle of war is intentionally oriented towards certain 
publics to make them (re)constitute themselves as the result of such exposure. 
Contemporary media has created a new dimension to how audiences perceive wars by 
making war reality so televised through the graphic quality of live broadcasting, that it 
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almost appears as though it is happening at home, even though the conflict is thousands 
of miles away. Real-time bombings and invasions are part of the media routine 
nowadays, often resembling a high-definition computer game (Lenoir, 2000). The logic 
of screen displays has become an integral part of terrorist propaganda (Silverstone, 
2007: 27). 
Indeed, war can be understood as the mechanism of communication, particularly 
that of strategic communication, which some analyze as ‘population-centric wars’– 
aimed at winning the popular support of the people of a country the war is conducted 
against (Butler, 2009; Holmqvist, 2013). Or, as it was explained by Richard Falk, 
“[there is a] scissors effect operating, between public pressure ‘to do something’ 
produced by media exposure to human wrongs, and the dominant realist predilection of 
states to ‘keep out’ unless vital interests are at stake.” The result is that “you get shallow 
intervention and a ‘politics of gesture’ rather than any intervention of a transformative 
nature…. the politics of gesture means that you do something, but you do something 
that does not involve big risks.” (Der Derian, 2009, p. 72). Such an international disdain 
towards war as a political practice is a new phenomenon for a modern state. In fact, war 
used to be generally understood by policymakers in the way Barkawi and Brighton 
state, “war is a generative force like no other. It is of fundamental significance for 
politics, society and culture ... War, the threat of war and the preparation for war mark 
the origins, transformation, and end of polities” (Barkawi, Brighton, 2011, 126). 
Moreover, as Jens Bartelson points out, “from the seventeenth to the early twentieth 
century, war has been saddled with an almost magical capacity to produce sociopolitical 
order out of its manifold negations, and has been involved in the shaping of actors and 
in the drawing of the boundaries separating them” (Bartelson, 2016). 
What is more, as has been discussed in the research puzzle, the fields of 
perception of modern war (Virilio, 1988) has changed as well due to technological 
developments in warfare itself. It is interesting that, from Virilio’s perspective, this 
substitution of military reality as something anchored in ‘a place’ began long ago: “in 
the thirties, it was already clear that film was superimposing itself on a geostrategy 
which, for a century or more, had inexorably been leading to the direct substitution, and 
thus sooner or later the disintegration, of things and places” (Virilio, 1988, 47). 
However, advanced modern warfare has reached levels of virtuality previously 
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unimaginable for military theorists. As a result, the spatial dimension of war is 
disappearing for the military and political leaders of militarily developed nations, 
depriving the popular conscription army system of its military purpose since, instead of 
millions of soldiers, modern warfare depends on technological advantages. 
Summing up, nowadays more than ever the symbolic meaning of war, and its 
performative function, is becoming the center point of the social function of war. The 
narrative of war legitimation now serves not just some pre-calculated goals but reflects 
the foundational assumptions about the identity of an actor and more importantly the 
logic based on which one acts. And in the case of Russia, this logic, and consequently 
its aims in the Syrian intervention, is neither the rationalist logic of consequence, nor 
the liberal logic of appropriateness. Instead, one can talk about constructivist logic with 
war being a means of self-representation to the significant “other.” Being in a just war is 
connected with being a Great Power since, as it is generally acknowledged to be one, a 
state requires a combination of military and economic resources in a combination with 
the attractiveness and recognition by other Great powers (Levy, 1981; Neumann, 2008; 
Nye, 1990). And it appears that Russian leadership believes that only through re-
creating the situation of being a “savior” in a war, can it become accepted in a dialogue 
the way Russia believes it deserves.  
Therefore, war, the way Russia interprets it, and the intervention in Syria in 
particular, has a value of a very particular kind – it allows the country to do a morally 
good and right thing. Civilians have to die or suffer from the “evil” force somewhere so 
Russia can save them and by being a “savior” prove that it should be spoken to as an 
equal, and ideally to stop the process of “globalization” of international relations and 
prevent them from becoming transcendental. Evil must exist so that Russia can fight it 
and to be praised for its efforts. 
Summing, up the analysis of the Russian narrative of its intervention in the 
Syrian civil war has revealed several important elements. In particular, it allows an 
understanding of the problem with seemingly missing “goal” presented in Table 1, 
when one speaks of “ethical narratives” of intervention developed in Russian media. 
It appears that the key global conflict for Russia is between two logics of the 
‘international’: “transcendental/global/liberal” and “structured/national.” These logics 
can not coexist peacefully together unless there is a space for dialogue as well as a way 
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to communicate. Moreover, this problem of co-existence is not one of national interests 
in a utilitarian way but instead of morality and values. Therefore, it appears that, prior to 
intervention in Syria, the key problem between the two logics was an absence of 
communication based on understanding. The Russian leadership, following the 
narrative,	 believes to know the “evil” logic behind the USA and the EU policies, 
whereas the Russian way of thinking and looking upon the world is ignored; promises 
given to Russia are broken and the country and its leadership are not being treated as 
morally equal. From this perspective, constant references to the deeds of other powers 
go beyond a mere propaganda tool, labeled by modern media and scholars as 
“whataboutism.” Instead, it reflects the Russian leadership’s deepest belief about 
international relations.  
In such a context, the intervention in Syria within the Russian discourse was, to 
an extent, not at all about Syria. As any human, the Russian leadership desires be in the 
“right.” But in the current Russian mainstream, the experience of “being right” is built 
upon the historical experience of World War II as a “just war.” As the result, it is only 
through recreating this war experience that Russia can fill the emptiness in the gap 
between how it is seen by the international community and how it sees itself. 
One principal question remains, though, and it is the question of time. War in 
Syria has been raging since 2011, but Russia interfered only in September 2015. To see 
how the issue of timing has been addressed within the Russian narrative, this thesis will 
proceed to analyze the data revealed in the place of conflict in Ukraine in the context of 
Syrian intervention. This will be represented in the closing chapter of the research. 
 
Context	of	war	in	Ukraine	in	the	Russian	narrative	of	intervention	into	Syrian	civil	
war	
 
The conclusions drawn in the previous chapter have discussed the narrative of 
the war in Syria without referring to the context of another conflict Russia has been 
involved prior and during it: the war in Eastern Ukraine. In fact, one of the most popular 
explanations as for the motives behind the Russian intervention in Syria is connected 
precisely with the international implications of Russian aggression against Ukraine. 
There are a number of comments that consider Russia’s goal in Syria to be to secure a 
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deal with the United States over Ukraine, and post-Soviet space in general, in exchange 
for the cooperation of Russia in Syria, possible concessions of Russian influence in the 
country, or Russia taking on the most difficult role in dealing with ISIS (Nye, 2016; 
Macfarquhar, 2016; Bodner, 2015). Such an explanation still fits into the realist 
paradigm, however this in fact answers more questions about the paradoxes of the 
Russian operation. Firstly, this idea links the Syrian intervention to a broader context of 
Russian foreign policy during the last 10 years and especially the period post-2014. 
Secondly, it explains the timing of the operation – after Russian defeat in Ukraine. 
Thirdly, treating the Russian intervention in the Syrian civil war as a diversion from the 
conflict in Ukraine makes the eagerness of Russian withdrawal from the conflict in 
March 2016 far more reasonable. 
Therefore, from the perspective of this thesis, it is important to discern how the 
war in Ukraine was put within the context of the Russian narrative of intervention in 
Syria. The question in particular is to figure out how the conflict in Ukraine fits into 
established discursive oppositions, as well as Russia’s supposed desire to be understood 
and accepted by the West. To figure it out, apart from the discourse analysis, the thesis 
will also contrast the importance attached to both topics (Syria and Ukraine) over the 
year prior to and during the intervention in Syria. 
First, an important distinction must be made. From the very beginning, the anti-
Ukrainian element on Russian federal television could be subdivided into two 
narratives: “the war in Ukraine narrative” and “Ukraine as a failing state narrative.” The 
war narrative embraces the body of ideas that can be summarized under the notions of 
“a Russian world,” “Novorossia,” “Crimea as a part of Russia,” “Bandera and 
Faschism,” and any reports about military activity on the territories of so-called 
“people’s republics.” The ‘Ukraine as a failing state’ narrative focuses on the issues of 
Ukrainian domestic politics, socio-economic difficulties in the country, political 
scandals etc. – all information that can create an impression among Russian audience 
that the neighboring country is on the verge of collapsing. To trace how the usage of 
these two narratives has been implemented alongside the narrative of the danger of ISIS 
terrorism and the Russian fight against terrorism in Syria, a more detailed research was 
required. 
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Therefore, I conducted a discourse analysis of the same dataset of “Vesti-
Nedeli” but from a different angle. All Sunday news reports from February 2014 until 
April 2016 have been analyzed and the share of all three narratives (“the war in Ukraine 
narrative”, “Ukraine as a failing state narrative” and “fight against terrorism in 
Syria/ISIS terrorism threat narrative”) in the entire body of the news program has been 
counted (share of minutes devoted to the narrative/total number of minutes in the news 
program).  
Based on the patterns discovered, it was expected that several time-marks would 
indicate shifts in the proportions of the Russian propaganda narrative inputs into the 
public opinion. In particular, the war narrative should dominate in the year 2014, 
whereas following the signing of the Minsk 2 agreement, “Ukraine as a failing state” 
should become the primary narrative. Finally, based on chart 2, the “ISIS as a menace” 
narrative cannot start being enforced into public opinion earlier than August 2015.  
The results of this study are presented in the chart below. 
 
Chart 1. Share of “war in Ukraine narrative”, “Ukraine as a failing state narrative” and 
“fight against terrorism in Syria/ISIS terrorism threat narrative” in Vesti-Nedeli news 
broadcasts 
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A first look at this chart confirms suggestions that the war in Syria could be a so-
called “distraction operation.” In March 2015, for the first time, the narrative of “war in 
Ukraine” stopped being the dominant one in the Sunday news broadcasts. Instead, focus 
on the events within Ukraine became the what was emphasized. Therefore, it is possible 
to argue that the Russian elite (not wanting to get rid of the Ukrainian discourse 
completely as it has become an integral part of Russian TV propaganda), decided to 
persuade the Russian audience that, despite an absence of clear military victory, the 
Ukrainian state will eventually return to Russia, being unable to survive on its own. At 
the same time, the general share of anti-Ukrainian propaganda in Vesti-Nedeli 
broadcasts dropped dramatically between March 2015 and April 2015: from 42% of 
screen time to 18,5%. The next relative peak of anti-Ukraine propaganda happened in 
July 2015 (25%), with the Ukraine-war narrative constituting only 6% of the screen 
time. After this came a two-month period (August and most of September 2015) in 
which the Russian public was not subjected to any massive military propaganda: 
nothing anti-Ukrainian and relatively moderate anti-ISIS. Finally, with the start of the 
operation in Syria, Russian media became almost entirely focused on it. 
However, the development of the shares of coverage of these wars potentially 
indicates a mere connection between the two, rather than the causal link. Therefore, one 
must look how Ukraine has been portrayed in the examined Russian media within the 
narrative of intervention in Syria. Several conclusions can be made based on such 
analysis.  
First, Ukraine has only rarely been referenced to within the context of 
intervention in Syria. When such references do happen, it was always precisely while 
talking about the ‘international space.’ The key opposition of “inclusion vs. exclusion” 
and “honesty vs. dishonesty.” For example, Russian media’s discussion on the contrast 
between the way Russia was spoken to and the way Ukraine was spoken to during the 
international summits. In regards to a meeting between Putin and Obama, which 
happened during the UN general assembly in September 2015, it was highlighted that 
“Ukraine was not a priority” (VN, 4/10/2015, 32:55) and “Europe got tired of Ukraine” 
(VN, 4/10/2015, 38:26). Moreover, American policy towards Ukraine was presented as 
dishonest: “Obama: sex with no responsibilities … what has happened – happened, it 
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was based on mutual agreement and there is no reason to talk about it now” (VN, 
4/10/2015, 32:58).  
Thus, it is possible to argue that Russian leadership indeed hoped to shift the 
importance of war in Ukraine aside once the intervention in Syria had begun. However, 
in the broader picture of Russian discourse this meant not interest-based policy, but 
instead a policy of restoration of the “true” Russian image. Indeed, after the war in 
Ukraine, Russia has been viewed globally as a country-aggressor and by no means 
could be considered a morally right power. Yet the narrative of intervention in Syria 
indicates how important it is for the country and the government to be treated as Russia 
deserves. And from the Russian perspective, war in Ukraine has never been unjust. 
Instead it is the West that breaks all its promises, in particular the agreement with 
Janukovitch and promoting the coup d’etat – in other words, promoting chaos. The 
Russian involvement in Ukraine was therefore not an attempt to rebuild the Soviet 
empire, but to restore order and justice and to be a “savior” again. Instead, Russia has 
become an international pariah. In other words, the war Ukraine, within the Russian 
discourse of Syrian intervention, is an “empty signifier” (Laclau, 2014).  
The notion of an empty signifier supposes that in a discourse –  being 
understood as the system of meanings assigned to objects and not the language per se – 
for the system to be coherent, there must always be something excluded from the 
system itself, something outside of the system, which makes the system possible only 
being left aside from the system. And for the system of the discourse of Syrian 
intervention, Ukraine is a distortion that blocks the communication between Russia and 
its significant “others.” Here it is important to mention, that in 2014 only 11 countries 
out of 193, while voting in the UN, supported Russia in its case against Ukraine over 
the annexation of Crimea. The same year, according to Pew Research Center, “across 
the 44 countries surveyed, a median percentage of 43% have unfavorable opinions of 
Russia, compared with 34% who are positive. Negative ratings of Russia have increased 
significantly since 2013 in 20 of the 36 countries surveyed in both years, decreased in 
six and stayed relatively similar in the remaining 10” (Pew Research Center, 2015, 3). 
Other Great powers do not recognize Russia as such calling Russia a “regional power” 
at the very best (Guardian, 2014). 
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War in Ukraine has resulted in the gap between how Russia sees itself and how 
world sees it. Somehow dialogue should be restored. The way the discourse of the 
Russian intervention in Syria is constructed implies that Russia does not seek 
confrontation with the EU and the USA, but instead wants to help them solve the 
problems threatening them –be it a refugee crisis or the chaos caused by American 
policy in the Middle East. However, the language used in the Russian narrative does not 
necessarily imply making a deal as in trade negotiations. Instead, it is a language of a 
process of constantly continuing communication.  
By the summer of 2015, this communication stopped and from the Russian 
perspective has to be restored. This can be supported by placing emphasis on Russia’s 
readiness for cooperation, its readiness for joint operations against ISIS, and ton 
Russian openness towards a fair dialogue. Therefore, the connection between wars in 
Ukraine and Syria within the Russian discourse is by no means causal but contextual. 
One can talk about the story of failed communication practices; but with the war in 
Ukraine Russia has found itself in a situation when its feeling of “being right” has 
become ignored by all relative others, and to restore this feeling and acceptance by the 
others, some action had to be taken.  
From such a perspective, the reasoning for timing of the Syrian operation 
becomes relatively clear. It happened right after any other opportunities of genuine 
dialog between Russia and Europe, and Russia and the USA, had been blocked. 
However, it does not make war in Syria a simple diversion from the war in Ukraine. 
Instead, it is part of a longer dialogue, a hand offered to the West to admit to each other 
the way they are. In a certain way, Ukraine is supposed to be traded off but not for 
Syria. As Dmitrii Kisilev pointed out while talking about potential joint declaration on 
Syria made by Russia and the USA: “Russia has no hidden goal – compare it with what 
the USA and its allies have done in Iraq and Lybia … well, these are deeds of the past – 
experience” (VN, 14/02/2016, 15:51). If Russia is ready to treat former US 
wrongdoings against what Russia perceives as “good” – state stability – then it is also 
implied that Russian leadership expected the same treatment of the war in Ukraine by 
the West. The war in Syria in such a context is a new beginning, not a diversion – the 
prospect of better relationship between Russia and the West, based on mutual 
acceptance.  
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Summing up, there is a clear similarity between the wars in Ukraine and Syria. It 
is difficult to discern if the Russian elite is interested in making Russia a great power, 
but based on the messages it spreads, the Russian elite clearly wants Russia to at least 
appear as one. Therefore, the wars in both Syria and Ukraine are symbolic. The Russian 
elite wants an improved image and recognition from the West, and not a full-scale war. 
The challenges for this strategy are obviously “reality constraints,” as previously 
discussed. Economically, Russia is not a great power, it is not ready for a full-scale war 
with any other states except failed ones.  
From this perspective, the conflict in Syria, which has been only deteriorating as 
of 2014 – autumn 2015 was a perfect stage for the Russian leadership to present itself to 
the world and the West in a “right” way as “a savior of civilization” (in particular 
Europe) against the barbarity of ISIS (caused by the “Evil” transcendental US logic of 
‘international’ meaning global). Such a performance was particularly necessary after the 
complete misunderstanding between Russia and the West that emerged during the 
revolution in Kiev and following the war in Eastern Ukraine. Moreover, in contrast to 
Ukraine, where the West and Russia have opposite understanding of what force is 
“evil,” in Syria there was a potential clear common enemy. And it is hardly a 
coincidence that calls to unite against this enemy have become the repeating motive of 
the Russian narrative during the entire period of operation in Syria.  
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Conclusion			 The	 aim	 of	 this	 thesis	 was	 to	 attempt	 to	 understand	 the	 Russian	intervention	 into	 the	 Syrian	 civil	 war	 utilizing	 a	 social	 constructivist	 approach.	There	were	several	questions	asked:	how	the	narrative	of	Russian	intervention	has	been	 constructed	 within	 Russian	 media,	 on	 which	 structural	 elements	 it	 was	based,	 as	well	 as	how	media	analysis	 can	be	used	 to	 research	armed	conflicts	 in	which	modern	 Russia	 is	 involved.	 Finally,	 what	 the	 deconstructed	 narrative	 can	add	to	the	understanding	of	the	worldview	Russian	leadership	believe	in.	As	with	most	 qualitative	 research,	 analysis	 of	 the	 discovered	 elements	 of	 discourse	 and	their	 interrelations	 resulted	 in	 certain	 assumptions	 that	 were	 not	 hypothesized	prior	 to	 the	 study.	 In	 the	 following	 conclusion,	 the	 results	 of	 the	 study	 will	 be	reviewed,	along	with	the	acknowledgement	of	its	limitations,	suggested	directions	for	future	research,	and	an	assessment	of	the	importance	of	the	findings	for	proper	evaluation	of	the	directions	of	Russian	foreign	policy	in	the	years	to	come.		
Review	of	Findings		First	 and	 foremost,	 the	 results	 of	 the	 research	 suggest	 that	 the	 primary	element	 of	 the	 Russian	 discourse	 of	 its	 intervention	 is	 that	 of	 an	 ethical	 origin.	More	 than	 any	 calculated	 or	 traditional	 security	 interests,	 the	 Russian	 media	emphasized	 the	 ethical	 dimension	 of	 the	 allegedly	 happening	 global	 conflict.		Russian	position	maintains	that	the	country	acts	as	an	independent	subject,	driven	by	 a	 good	 and	 just	moral	 compass.	 It	 is	 precisely	 this	 ethical	 purity	 that	makes	Russia	 a	better	 great	power	 than	 its	 opponents.	These	 statements	 apparently	 go	beyond	 being	 simple	 propaganda	 tools	 utilized	 by	 the	 Russian	 elite	 for	 some	practical	purposes.	Instead,	they	reflect	beliefs	about	the	identity	of	the	country	as	shared	by	the	elite	and	general	population	alike.	Consequently,	the	need	to	be	an	“independently	good	power”	sets	certain	discursive	limitations	for	Russian	foreign	policy.	
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Second,	 such	 an	 emphasis	 on	 the	moral	 side	 of	 the	 conflict	 highlights	 the	problem	 of	 the	 social	 function	 of	 war	 in	 Russia	 on	 an	 international	 as	 well	 as	domestic	level.	The	conducted	research	indicates	that	the	performative	element	of	war	–	war	as	a	stage	on	which	to	present	oneself	the	way	one	believes	one	is	–	has	become	the	central	element	of	war	as	a	social	phenomenon	in	modern	Russia.	War	is	not	a	continuation	of	politics	but	a	continuation	of	 identity.	And	in	the	Russian	case,	war	as	an	element	of	identity	is	particular	important	precisely	because	of	its	particular	moral	dimension:	being	univocally	good	and	right,	and	even	purified,	for	the	 wrongdoings	 of	 the	 past.	 Such	 a	 particular	 reading	 of	 war	 is	 most	 likely	connected	 with	 the	 discourse	 built	 around	 the	 Great	 Patriotic	 War,	 the	 moral	experience	of	which	is	being	recreated	today	with	the	help	of	modern	media.			Third,	 the	 second	 function	 of	 war,	 derived	 from	 its	 self-representative	element,	is	communicative.	Since	identity	can	develop	only	in	its	interrelation	with	the	 “other,”	 in	 modern	 Russia	 the	 intervention	 in	 Syria	 was	 in	 part	 a	communicative	 action,	 meant	 to	 remind	 the	 West	 of	 what	 Russia	 is.	 Separate	research	 is	 needed,	 though,	 to	 discover	 to	what	 extent	 the	Russian	message	 has	been	received	the	way	Russian	leadership	intended.	What	is	possible	to	point	out,	however,	 is	 that	 with	 the	 development	 of	 warfare	 technologies,	 the	 symbolic	elements	of	war,	as	well	as	the	discourses	built	around	them,	are	becoming	no	less	important	and	may	prove	even	more	so	than	the	actual	actions	on	the	battlefield.	Next,	 it	 appears	 that	 the	 timing	 of	 the	 Syrian	 intervention	 as	 a	communicative	 action	 was	 partially	 determined	 by	 the	 emergence	 of	 the	 gap	between	how	Russian	leadership	sees	the	country,	on	the	one	hand,	and	the	West	on	 the	other	 following	 the	conflict	 in	Ukraine.	The	war	 in	Ukraine	has	destroyed	the	 Russian	 image	 as	 a	 “good	 actor,”	 or	 as	 a	 “savior	 of	 Europe,”	 and	 has	 caused	Russia	to	seek	its	restoration	by	“saving”	Europe	once	more	in	Syria,	this	time	from	terrorist	threats	and	the	refugee	crisis.		Finally,	the	most	unexpected	finding	of	this	research	is	the	image	of	the	true	opponent	 of	 the	 Russian	 Federation	 within	 the	 narrative	 of	 Syrian	 intervention	and	 any	 war	 in	 general.	 Contrary	 to	 many	 assumptions,	 it	 is	 not	 the	 USA	 as	 a	country	nor	any	other	power.	Instead,	what	the	Russian	leadership	considers	to	be	its	enemy	is	the	opposing	logic	of	International,	which	this	thesis	defines	as	global	
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or	 transcendental.	 The	 Russian	 leadership	 is	 committed	 to	 resisting	 any	 project	that	claims	possession	of	a	universal	moral	code	followed	by	the	transnational,	or	even	 beyond-national,	 approach	 for	 the	 solution	 of	 global	 problems.	 Rather,	 the	Russian	 leadership	 supports	 an	 intra-national	 approach,	where	 different	 nations	and	 moral	 logics	 meet	 each	 other	 and	 cooperate	 on	 a	 solution	 to	 a	 challenge,	without	even	attempting	to	become	an	entity	that	goes	beyond	national	interests.	Compared	 to	 transcendental	 logic	which	 assumes	 that,	with	 the	 development	 of	international	 relations,	 a	 true	 global	 community	 as	 an	 entity	 of	 a	 new	 quality	greater	 than	 the	 sum	 of	 its	 parts	 will	 emerge.	 From	 the	 Russian	 narrative	perspective,	such	a	development	is	impossible	without	setting	a	particular	way	of	life	as	the	only	morally	right	one,	which	for	the	Russian	elite	is	unacceptable.	This	ethical	dimension	of	Russian	multipolarity,	as	the	resistance	to	moral	universalism	and	moral	unification	was	an	unexpected	discovery.	Here	 it	 should	 be	 highlighted	 that	 such	 an	 understanding	 of	 the	 Russian	enemy,	 from	 the	 perspective	 of	 the	 Russian	 elite,	 makes	 certain	 attitudes	 of	Russian	 foreign	 policy	 more	 understandable.	 Any	 entity	 committed	 to	transcendental	logic,	politicians,	or	projects	will	always	be	met	with	distrust.	From	this	 perspective,	 it	 is	 no	 coincidence	 that	 Barack	 Obama	 was	 the	 most	 hated	American	 president	 in	 the	 Russian	 media.	 Such	 hatred	 developed	 precisely	because	his	 image	was	 the	 embodiment	 of	 this	 transcendental	 logic	 of	 action,	 of	what	 in	 the	 USA	 is	 called	 progressivism.	 Distrust	 towards	 the	 European	 Union	appears	to	be	of	the	same	nature.	Rejecting	transcendental	logic,	and	the	potential	of	any	of	its	adherents	to	be	genuinely	committed	to	the	goal	of	the	betterment	of	humanity,	the	Russian	elite	views	all	actions	derived	from	such	logic	as	attempts	to	spread	 chaos	 and	 evil,	 or	 as	 simple	 neo-imperialism.	 Ironically,	 such	 an	understanding	 of	 what	 this	 thesis	 calls	 ‘transcendental	 logic	 of	 international’	ideologically	and	linguistically	unites	Russia	with	alt-right	forces	within	the	West	who	reject	the	globalism	of	progressivists.		As	the	result,	it	appears	that	the	true	problem	in	Russian-Western	relations	lies	not	in	the	clash	of	national	interests,	or	lack	of	trust	on	its	own,	but	the	lack	of	a	common	language	in	which	to	speak.	Being	unable	to	understand	or	to	believe	in	the	 logic	 of	 action	 of	 the	 one	 another	 results	 in	 a	 “broken	 phone”	 game	 when,	
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instead	of	messages,	parties	use	war,	sanctions,	and	countersanctions	resulting	in	any	attempt	at	discussion	devolving	into	a	game	of	“whataboutism.”	Therefore,	it	is	no	coincidence	that	effective	cooperation	regarding	Syria	between	Russia	and	the	West	has	not	emerged.			
Contributions	and	Further	direction	of	the	research		This	thesis	is	a	case	study	of	the	discursive	dimension	of	a	particular	event	in	 modern	 Russian	 history	 –	 the	 Russian	 intervention	 in	 the	 Syrian	 civil	 war.	However,	 there	 are	 still	 several	 results	 presented	 that	 can	 contribute	 to	international	relations	as	a	science.	To	begin	with,	this	study	contains	the	qualitative	analysis	of	a	body	of	data	previously	 unanalyzed.	 Most	 studies	 of	 modern	 Russian	 media	 are	 of	 an	instrumentalist	approach,	with	little	respect	paid	to	their	discursive	structure.		Secondly,	 another	 contribution	 is	 the	 enhancement	 of	 the	 existing	knowledge	of	 the	 interdependency	of	 such	matters	as	 the	development	of	media	and	war	technologies,	the	social	function	of	war,	the	problem	of	communication	in	international	relations,	identity,	and	foreign	policy	justification,	as	well	as	the	role	of	 language	 and	 moral	 beliefs	 in	 foreign	 policy	 making.	 Consequently,	 there	remains	the	need	for	a	multidisciplinary	approach	while	performing	an	analysis	of	foreign	policy	decisions.	Finally,	there	are	some	practical	considerations	for	predicting	the	direction	Russian	 foreign	 policy	might	 develop	 in	 the	 future	 based	 on	 the	 findings	 of	 this	research.	 Unfortunately,	 should	 the	 Russian	 elite	 fail	 to	 develop	 any	 way	 of	communicating	 in	 an	 international	 arena,	 as	 well	 as	 presenting	 itself	 via	 an	alternative	 to	war,	 there	 is	 the	 constant	 risk	of	 the	 country	entering	yet	 another	armed	 conflict.	 This	 places	 all	 of	 the	 post-soviet	 space	 into	 jeopardy,	 especially	countries	that	share	a	common	border	with	Russia:	Belarus,	Ukraine,	Kazakhstan	and	even	Estonia,	as	well	as	any	other	country	 the	Russian	military	 is	capable	of	attacking.		
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From	the	perspective	of	the	further	studies,	this	thesis	finds	that	it	is	crucial	to	 pursue	 further	 work	 on	 the	 question	 of	 the	 communicative	 element	 of	international	relations	in	a	broad	sense,	in	particular	theorizing	if	the	two	‘logics	of	international’	can	co-exist	with	each	other,	or	 if	 they	are	doomed	to	conflict	with	one	another	until	a	victor	 is	decided.	 Is	 there	any	space	 in	which	a	 true	dialogue	can	take	place,	and	what	kind	of	mediator	can	the	international	community	and	all	parties	 involved	 develop	 in	 order	 to	 create	 a	 language	 both	 logics	 can	 use	 to	communicate	 with	 each	 other?	 These	 are	 the	 questions	 further	 studies	 of	international	relations	must	answer.		 	
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Appendix	
List of reports from “Vesti-Nedeli” dataset, from which one can find citations in the 
thesis 
 
1. Безответственность США/ Bezotvetsvennost USA (2015, June 8). Vesti – 
Nedeli, Retrieved August 23, 2018, from 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LaeMVW5HMPQ&index=19&list=PL6Mn
xjOjSRsT4rPBrGLwEt1gh3Y6z8CgP 
2. Американские выкормыши/Amerikanskie Vukormishi (2015, June 8). Vesti – 
Nedeli, Retrieved August 23, 2018, from 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LaeMVW5HMPQ&index=19&list=PL6Mn
xjOjSRsT4rPBrGLwEt1gh3Y6z8CgP 
3. Покушение в Сребренице/Pokushenie v Srebrrenice (2015, July 12). Vesti – 
Nedeli, Retrieved August 23, 2018, from 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yzhNDdMulik&index=17&list=PL6MnxjOj
SRsT4rPBrGLwEt1gh3Y6z8CgP 
4. Что в Сирии/Chto v Sirii (2015, September, 13). Vesti – Nedeli, Retrieved 
August 23, 2018, from 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wV7BKKm2UrI&list=PL6MnxjOjSRsT4rP
BrGLwEt1gh3Y6z8CgP&index=16 
5. Мир становится другим/Mir Stanovitchya drugim (2015, September, 13). Vesti 
– Nedeli, Retrieved August 23, 2018, from 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wV7BKKm2UrI&list=PL6MnxjOjSRsT4rP
BrGLwEt1gh3Y6z8CgP&index=16 
6. Вписываясь в ландшафт/Vpisyvayas v landschaft (2015, September, 20). Vesti 
– Nedeli, Retrieved August 23, 2018, from 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ng8Sh7kCTBg&list=PL6MnxjOjSRsT4rPB
rGLwEt1gh3Y6z8CgP&index=15 
7. Нью-Йорк ждет Путина/New-York zdet Putina (2015, September, 29). Vesti – 
Nedeli, Retrieved August 23, 2018, from 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6KWYncbHAMI&index=14&list=PL6Mnx
jOjSRsT4rPBrGLwEt1gh3Y6z8CgP 
8. Стереть цивилизацию/Steret civilizaciyu (2015, September, 29). Vesti – 
Nedeli, Retrieved August 23, 2018, from 
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https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6KWYncbHAMI&index=14&list=PL6Mnx
jOjSRsT4rPBrGLwEt1gh3Y6z8CgP 
9. В небе Сирии/ V nebe Sirii (2015, October, 4). Vesti – Nedeli, Retrieved 
August 23, 2018, from 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0PfRVdUScug&list=PL6MnxjOjSRsT4rPB
rGLwEt1gh3Y6z8CgP&index=13 
10. Неприличная грязь/Neprilichnaya gryaz (2015, October, 4). Vesti – Nedeli, 
Retrieved August 23, 2018, from 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0PfRVdUScug&list=PL6MnxjOjSRsT4rPB
rGLwEt1gh3Y6z8CgP&index=13 
11. Лидеры. Кто что хочет/ Lidery. Ko chto chochet (2015, October, 4). Vesti – 
Nedeli, Retrieved August 23, 2018, from 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0PfRVdUScug&list=PL6MnxjOjSRsT4rPB
rGLwEt1gh3Y6z8CgP&index=13 
12. Ракетный привет/Raketnii Privet (2015, October, 11). Vesti – Nedeli, Retrieved 
August 23, 2018, from 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MpSnGJr6qEM&index=12&list=PL6Mnxj
OjSRsT4rPBrGLwEt1gh3Y6z8CgP 
13. Шпак/ Schpak (2015, October, 11). Vesti – Nedeli, Retrieved August 23, 2018, 
from 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MpSnGJr6qEM&index=12&list=PL6Mnxj
OjSRsT4rPBrGLwEt1gh3Y6z8CgP 
14. Интервью/Interviyu (2015, October, 11). Vesti – Nedeli, Retrieved August 23, 
2018, from 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MpSnGJr6qEM&index=12&list=PL6Mnxj
OjSRsT4rPBrGLwEt1gh3Y6z8CgP 
15. Занимаем Оборону/Zanimaem oboronu (2015, October, 18). Vesti – Nedeli, 
Retrieved August 23, 2018, from 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=n0aNRXKKQJw&list=PL6MnxjOjSRsT4rP
BrGLwEt1gh3Y6z8CgP&index=11 
16. Россия-США: Момент Истины (2015, October, 18). Vesti – Nedeli, Retrieved 
August 23, 2018, from 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=n0aNRXKKQJw&list=PL6MnxjOjSRsT4rP
BrGLwEt1gh3Y6z8CgP&index=11 
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17. Слушали по-новому/ Sluschali po-novomu (2015, October, 25). Vesti – Nedeli, 
Retrieved August 23, 2018, from 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gIzJlkXu1IY&list=PL6MnxjOjSRsT4rPBr
GLwEt1gh3Y6z8CgP&index=10 
18. Хорошие новости/ Choroschie novosti (2015, November, 1)  Vesti – Nedeli, 
Retrieved August 23, 2018, from	
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=T_Lc8wZFmMc&index=9&list=PL6Mnxj
OjSRsT4rPBrGLwEt1gh3Y6z8CgP 
19. Сможем ли вместе / Smozem li vmeste? (2015, November, 15)  Vesti – Nedeli, 
Retrieved August 23, 2018, from 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-
Rjb4T_O7jo&list=PL6MnxjOjSRsT4rPBrGLwEt1gh3Y6z8CgP&index=7 
20. Возмездие/ Vozmezdie (2015, November, 22)  Vesti – Nedeli, Retrieved 
August 23, 2018, from 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-
zXaHRIKggk&list=PL6MnxjOjSRsT4rPBrGLwEt1gh3Y6z8CgP&index=6 
21. Послание/Poslanie (2015, December, 6)  Vesti – Nedeli, Retrieved August 23, 
2018, from 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gP4dj0wrz50&list=PL6MnxjOjSRsT4rPBr
GLwEt1gh3Y6z8CgP&index=4 
22. Гора родила мышь/Gora rodila mysch (2015, December, 13)  Vesti – Nedeli, 
Retrieved August 23, 2018, from 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9WfTc_5CNOY&list=PL6MnxjOjSRsT4rP
BrGLwEt1gh3Y6z8CgP&index=3 
23. Год битвы с терроризмом/ God bitvy s terrorismom (2015, December, 27)  
Vesti – Nedeli, Retrieved August 23, 2018, from 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UuSgOD5TofM&index=1&list=PL6MnxjO
jSRsT4rPBrGLwEt1gh3Y6z8CgP 
24. Коренной Перелом/ Korennoy perelom (2016, January, 17) Vesti – Nedeli, 
Retrieved August 23, 2018, from 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=K78axyYTia4&index=95&list=PL6MnxjOj
SRsRzsISAlU-JcbTi7_a5wB_v 
25. New norm/New norm (2016, January, 24) Vesti – Nedeli, Retrieved August 23, 
2018, from 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cpXx0ZKEHlQ&index=94&list=PL6Mnxj
OjSRsRzsISAlU-JcbTi7_a5wB_v 
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26. Возврат к вуду/ Vozvrat kVudu (2016, January, 31) Vesti – Nedeli, Retrieved 
August 23, 2018, from 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=E_Kd5EPQe78&list=PL6MnxjOjSRsRzsIS
AlU-JcbTi7_a5wB_v&index=93 
27. Наступление/Nastuplenie (2016, January, 31) Vesti – Nedeli, Retrieved August 
23, 2018, from 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=E_Kd5EPQe78&list=PL6MnxjOjSRsRzsIS
AlU-JcbTi7_a5wB_v&index=93 
28. Россия – США: находим решение/ Rossiya – USA nachodim reshenie (2016, 
February, 14) Vesti – Nedeli, Retrieved August 23, 2018, from 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=K1YU20pZ9nU&list=PL6MnxjOjSRsRzsI
SAlU-JcbTi7_a5wB_v&index=91 
29. Кому нужна большая война/ Komu nuzna bolschaya voina (2016, February, 
21) Vesti – Nedeli, Retrieved August 23, 2018, from 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NsSLXv031sc&index=90&list=PL6MnxjOj
SRsRzsISAlU-JcbTi7_a5wB_v 
30. Мы за мир/My za Mir (2016, February, 28) Vesti – Nedeli, Retrieved August 
23, 2018, from 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LVRuUXuqLyQ&index=89&list=PL6Mnxj
OjSRsRzsISAlU-JcbTi7_a5wB_v 
31. Добро побеждает зло/ Dobro pobezhdaet zlo (2016, March, 13) Vesti – Nedeli, 
Retrieved August 23, 2018, from 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iZ5Kp4ze7QQ&list=PL6MnxjOjSRsRzsIS
AlU-JcbTi7_a5wB_v&index=87 
32. Вывод/Vyvod (2016, March, 20) Vesti – Nedeli, Retrieved August 23, 2018, 
from 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2hnGmzp5ppM&list=PL6MnxjOjSRsRzsIS
AlU-JcbTi7_a5wB_v&index=86 
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